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At i,ts meeti,ng i,n Harnburg on lil January 1970 the toint Commi,ttee d,ecid,ed,, î,n cotnplianoe w'i,th Avtî,cl,e 14 ol the
Rul,es ol Proced,ure, to subruit a rcport ta the Pailàarnentary Conference ol tke Assoc'i,at'i,on on the S'i,rtk Annual Report
an the Actiai.ties ol tke Assocdation Ceuna,il. Mr. Gai,l,labert was aÿpoi,nfad, RaPporteuri,n accordance witk Arti,ale 16
ol the Rules ol Proced,wre.
The problems rai,sed, by the Associati,on during the cowrse ol 1970 were exam'î,ned, by tke Joi,nt Committee at i,ts rneetings
on 20,21,22 and, 23 May'i,n Florcnce and on 28,29 and' 30 October 1970 in Lî,braille.
Tke erplanatory statetnent was unan'i,mously aÿfuoaed on 30 October 1970 in Libreuille, ï,m the presence ol: Mr. Ngoo'
Mebe (Camcroon), Chairman; Mv. Achenbach, Vi,ce-Chairrnan; Mr. Ai.gner, Mr. Arrnengauil, Mr. Bos (deputi,zi,ng
lor Mr. Werner), Mt. Briot, Mr. Ntahabanyowa (Br,wundî,), Mr. Ayand,o (Central Afri,can Refubl,i.c), Mr. Ibata
(Refuùl,i,c ol the Congo), Mr. Bango-Bango (Demouati,c Repwbl,i,c ol ühe Congo), Mr Ebagni,tchi.e (Iaory Coast),
Mr. Dawuff, Mr. Fellermai,ey, Mr. Bauanga (Gabon), Mr. Gal,li, (d,epwüizî,ng lor Mr. Santero), Mr. Gerlach (d,epwli,zing
lor Mr. Corena), Mr. Gi,rard,àn (defuti,zing fot, Mr. Col,i,n), Mr. Glinne, Mr. Korupaara (Upper VoHa), Mr. Lauilvi,n,
Mr. Andyianatoro (Mad,agascol), Mr- SassoÉo (Ma,l,i), Mr. Fall Babaha (Mauri,tani,a), Mr.Offroy (d,eputi.zing lor
Mr. Hunault), Mr. Nilnhayo (Rwand,a), Mr. Val,anti,n (Senegal) (deputî,zi,ng lor Mr. Guillabert), Mv. Ornar Gi,avna
(Somal,i,a), Mr, Spénale, Mr. Dagadow (Togo), Mr. llestertarp (d,efutizi,ng lor Mr. Sckuiit).
The rnolion lor a rcsol,uti,en was unani,rnousl,y ad,opted, on I Janua,ry 1971 in Yaounü, i,n the presence ol: Mr. Ngoo
Mebe (Camcroon), Ckai,rrnan; Mr. Ach,enhack, V'i,ce-Ckaivman; Mr. Gui,llabert (Senegal), Rappofieur; Mr. Aignnr,
Mr. Bersani, Mr. Bri,ot, Mr. Nüahabanyura (Burund,i,), Mr. Cali,fice (depwti,zi,ng lor Mr. Colin), Mr. Kassongo
(Delnoaati,o Repoùlia ol the Cango), Mr. Coruna, Mr. Ebagnî,tahie (Iuory Coast), Mr. Deurul,f, Mr. Fel,lermai,er,
Mr, Beuanga (Gabon), Mr. Gi,rard,,i,n (d,epulizi,ng lw Mr. Santero), Mr. Gli,nne, Mr. Kal,enzaga (Upper Volta),
Mr. Houd,et (defuti,zi,ng lor Mr. Armengaud,), Mr. Laudv'i,n, Mr. And,rianatmo (Madagascar), Mr. SissoÉo (Mali),
Mr. Fal,l, Babaha (Mauritania), Mr. Perret (Niger), Mts. Ottk (defuti,zi,ng lor Mr. Hein), Mr. Nd,ahayo (Rwanna),
Mr. Schuiiü, Mr. Ornw Gi,arna (Sornali,a), Mr. Sourdi,lle (deputi,zin6 lor Mr. Hunawl,ü), Mr. Spénale, Mr. Aladji
Ou.ed.d,o (Chad), Mr. De Meileiros (Togo), Mr. Tri,boul,et (d,eputi.zi,ng lor Mr. Habi,b-Delonck), Mr. Werner.
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AMotion for a Resolution
on the Sixth Annual Report on the Activities of the Council of Association
The Parliamentary Conference of tke Association,
- 
meeting in Yaoundé from 11 to 13 January 1971, in compliance with Article 52
of the Convention of Âssociation between the European Economic Community
and the African and Mala6asy States, signed in Yaoundé on 29 July 1969,
- 
having noted the Sixth Annual Report on the Activities of the Council of Asso-
ciation (Doc. 32-I/II) and the report of the Commission of the European Com-
munities to the Council on the management of financial and technical cooperation
in 1969 (Doc. 32-III),
- 
having heard statements by the President of the Council of Association, the
President of the Council of the Communities and. the representative of the
Commission of the Communities,
- 
recalling its resolutions of l0 December 1964, I December 1965, 14 December
1966,7 December 1967, 15 January 1969 and 13 January f970,e)
- 
having regard to the report and complementary report presented by Mr. Guilla-
bert on behalf of the Joint Committee (Docs. 34 and 35),
1. Notes with pleasure that the Second Yaoundé Convention has come into fôrce
as scheduled on I January 1971, the expiry date of the transitiona.l measures which
have made for continuity and normal operation of the Association in the interim
period;
2. Recalls that the Association proüdes a permanent framework for measures
taken by the European Community to promote the development of the Associated
States, based on the mutual desire of all the partners to cooperate and on their sense
of common purpose, in particular at the inter-African level;
' 3. Records with satisfaction that the coming into force of the new Convention
coincides with the beginning of the Second Decade of the United Nations for Develop-
ment to which all parties to the Convention have pledged support;
I
I
I
l
(1) Omctd guette of the Eurolm Commitiæ No. C 15, 5.2.7q p. g.
l;
l. Instc'tüional, rnafrgrs 
\
' 4. Stresses that, whilst bearing in mind the poütical trends shown bythe Parlia-
mentary Conference, the Council of Association must continue to take political
decisions and meet in the presence of the responsible rninisters from the twenty four
States so that decisions are reached after hearing all the pârtners in the Association
at governmental level;
6. Hopes that the consultations provided for in the Convention will effectively
saleguard the ütal interests of the Associated States and that, with this aim in
mind, the EEC Member States will refrain from entering into final commitments,
which may have a bearing on the Association's progress, before consulting the
Associated States.
lI. Tra.d,e .
6. Is pleased that for the second yeax running, exports from the AASM to the
Community rose in 1969 by a total of 17 per cent 
- 
i.e. at a; higher rate than fhe
average increase in exports from all the developing countries to the Community;
?. Notes, however, that there were substaatial variations by country and product
8. Notes with satisfaction that there has been further diversiûcation in the nature
of exports from the AASM both to the six Member States 
-and to non-member
countries;
9. Notes that improvements have been made in the arrangements for importing
into the Community certain agricultural products of the AASM which compete with
similar European pfuducts and that accordingly'it should be possible to take more
mezrsures of this kind in particular for sugar from the AASM;
10. Regrets that the suspension of duties decided for certain products, which has
resulted in a decrease of the tariff preferences enjoyed by the AASM, should have
taken place before the sales promotion measures laid down in the new Convention
have become operational and bèfore a policy has been enüsaged to stabilize the mar-
ket rates for primary commodities and thus effectively remedy the deterioration in
the terms of trade fqom which most of the developing countries and in particular the
AASM continue to suffer;
11. Notes that 
- 
in case of a .haoge in the cyclical situation and, in particular,
in case of a marked drop in the prices of products subject to suspended duties 
- 
the
Community will ieconsider the decision it has taken and will if necessary, go back
on'the suspension measures in order to take into account the interests of the AASM;
12. Appreciates the provisions in the new Convention designed to improve the
possibilities of promoting sales of AASU producfs and the measures already taken
Ior this purpose by the Commission of the Communities while pointing out that
these measures will only have short term effects;
f3. with this aim in mind, invites the AASM to work out a parallel programme
of vigorous local action to improve their marketing structures a.lrd train qualifisfl
marketing personnel in larger numbers;
14. Considers, however,' that these Sales promotion measures cannot dispense
the Community and Associated States from jointly promoting a:r efiective poücy
on primary commodities by encouraging, on a worldwide basis, theworknowbeing'
done by UNCTAD and the International Monetary Fund to define and implement
measures aimed in particular at bringing about an improved balance between supply
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and demand, at fixing proûtable prices for the producer anà equitable prices for the
consluner, at f,nancing any necessary regulating stocks and at setting up in appropri-
ate cases a programme for the diversiûcation of production;
15. Emphasizes that, according to sgrveys carried out by the United Nations
Economic Committee for Africa, the generâlized preferences suggested by UNCTAD
for manufactured and semi-manufactured products of the developing countries
might, owing to the low level of industrialization of the least advanced countries 
-which include two thirds of the Associated African States and Madagascar,- increase
the leeway of these countries if the following principles are not strictly adhered to:
these generalized preferences must
(a) conform fully with the spirit of Resolution 24lll adopted in New Delhi and
therefore be applied without discrimination or reoiprocity;
(b) take effect simultaneously and for.the same range of products in all the developed
countries which have offered to grant preJerences; this simultaneousness is an
essential prereqüsite for application of genera,lized preferences in a manner which
is fair-to all concerned, it being understood that the implementation of these
preferences depends upon the'oulcome of the consultationJ regarding the reverse
preferences.
16. Atso considers it essential that the generalized preferences
(a) be accompanied by the indispensable guarantees stipulated at the New Delhi
Conference for the least advanced countries and for those countries which beneût
from regional preferences and would be adversely affected by the application
of generalized preferences,
(b) on no account replace the system of regional preferences on whiçh the Association
is founded in the spirit of Protocol No.IV annexed to the Convention;
lll. Financial and, technicai cooperation
17. Is gratiûed with the increase in the overall amount of financial aid graated
to the developirig countries by the six Member States of the Communityasawhole'
-which now exceeds 1 per cent of their total gross national product - and inpartic-ular-with the increase in aid granted to the AASM under the Second Yaoundé
Convention;
18. Notes that the coordination befween the bilateral programmes of ûnancial
and technical cooperation and Community programmes is gradually improüng and
considers that it must be pursued;
19. Appreciates the arfangements made by'the Council of Association and. the
action taken by the Commission of the Communities in commissioring during the
transitional period surveys of investment projects to be financed from the third
European Development Fund so as to offset, to some extent, the effects of delays in
reaching decisions on ûnancing due to the long time taken to ratify the Second
Yaoundé Convention;
20. Considers that it is necessary to continue the diversificati,on and development
of the agriculturaleconomies of the AASM and to adjust technical assistance measures
in this field to present-day requirements;
21. Considers it signiÊcant that the Association has resolutely chosen the in-
dustrial option, with the active support of the European Investment Bank, as a
vital, although not exclusive, contribution to the development of the AASM;
22. Hopes that, quite apart from the technical procedures laid down in the Con-
vention, the Community will make full allowance in its commercial and industrial
i
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policy for its responsibilities to the developing countries and more particularly to
the AASM, through a policy of industrial transfer which should now be outlined;
23. Is pleased $rith the steps taken by the governments of some EEC Member
States to guarantee against risks of a non-ecorlomic nature, investments by their
nationals which contribute to the creation of new wealth in the AASM, since these
measures are a useful encouragement to industrialization;
24. Feels that the difficulties standing in the way of industrialization can be
overcome particularly if the Associated States themselves manage to enlarge their
rnarkets through economic groupings and better coordination of their industrialization
policies;
lY. The fwtwre of tltc Association
25. Considers that a future enlargement of the Association could make a useful
contribution to African unity by promoting regional economic groupings;
26. Notes, however, that enlargement also entails commercial risks for the AASM,
in particular because of the very keen competition to which their basic agricultural
products would be exposed;
27 .Accordingly requests that the AASM may be enabled to assert their in-
terests on the Council and Association Committee in connexion, in particular, with
the information which the Commissibn must provide at regular intervals 
- 
in
compliance with the obligations resulting from the Yaoundé Convention 
- 
on
relevant aspects of the negotiations with the countries which have appüed for
membership of the Community and on the prospects which the enlarged Community
would offer to the AASM.
28. Invites its President to forward this resolution and the relevant report to the
Council of Association, the European Parliament and the Parüaments of the Associa-
ted States, the Council and Commission of the European Communities and, for
irrformation, to the European Investment Bank.
BEXPLANATORY STATEMENT
INTRODUCTION
1. The Association is at a turning point in its
history. It is on the verge of a new period of change
and uncertainty.
The changes taking place with the new taoundéII Couvention are a result, among other things, of
a development set in train by the standing confron-
tation of two schools of thought. The Association
was from the very beginning regarded by some as
a purely transitional arrangement which would go
by the board once the AASM attained full economic
and political independence. For others 
- 
and in
partièular ior the parliamentarians of the Associa-
tion for whom this has always been a matter of
principle 
- 
the Association is the framework for
an enduring cooperation between Europe and
Africa.
The uncertainty now surrounding the Associa-
tion is due to the convergence of a number of events
whose cumulative influence has afiected the
Association in varying degrees.
2. The first uncertainty arising in 1969 was the
unduly long prolongation bf the transitional period;
the effects ôf this are discussed throughôut the
Sixth General Report on the Activities of the Coun-
cil of Association. The Association Committee, for
example, was obliged to extend the transitional
meiLsures, origtnally scheduled to apply until 30
June, up to 3l December 1970. This extension of
the time-Iimits laid down for the transitional
period was due to the fact that the Yaoundé II
Convention had not been ratiûed by some Member
States. Since then events have taken a more favour-
able turn and the new Convention came into
force on I January 1971 following the deposit of
the instruments of ratification by-the Netherlands
and Italy.
Rightly br wrongly these delays in ratification
lent colour to the view among the AASM that some
Parliaments of the Member States had ulterior
motives and that their Govdrnments were not in
a position to fulfi.l, urithin a reasonable period, the
commitments they had entered into (1). As the
debates held by the Joint Committee in Libreville
showed, the psychological effect'of this uncertainty
affected the climate of confidence in the Association
in 1969, although the transitional period actually
had fewer adverse effects in terms of trade and
finance than might have been feared, thanks to
the timely measirres taken by the Commission of
the Communities and the Council of the Association.
3. These delays in the ratification of the Com-
munity's commitments !ÿvere all the more alarming
to the Associated States because they occurred at
a time when the AASM were in real need of re-
assurarce about the future in view of the external
threats bearing down on the Association: the
obyious opposition of the United States and the
pressure it exerts on certain Member States are
not without effect on the policy of the latter.
Similarly the Association has not been unafiected
by the internal pressures in certain business circles
within the Community whose sources of supply
lie in countries other than the AASM.
This spirit of opposition, which hung over the
renewal of Yaoundé I, continues to lie heavy on
the negotiations in GATT and UNCTAD. It is
worth noting that the renewal of Yaoundé II was
only secured at the price of certain concessions,
i.e. a reduction in the preferences enjoyed, by the
AASM on Community markets. Despite the protests
of the Associated African States the Six confirmed
at the meeting of the Council of Association on
30 September that they would make reductions
in the common customs tariff on a series of tropical
products, including three major export products
of the AASM, when the Convention came into
force.
4. These cuts in regional preferences on prfunary
comrnod,it'ies enjoyed by the AASM are being made
at a time when UNCTAD plans to introduce a
system of generalized preferences on manwfactwres
(r) Itâly; fG erople, tæk thre yæ to ratify Dæision 67/491, âdoPt€q
' by the Coucil oI the Commitis @ 27 July 1967 o! the Srqgliiog of
ûrucial aid for the oleaginom goducts of tüe AÂSM' As a
ræult a Commity decislou of ræl importace itr lts effæts on ttrê
Asæiated States was held up mtil qüte recently.
i
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and, sem;i-rusnwfactures of all the developing countries
during the course of 1971. This will therefore reduce
the preferences also granted to the AASM on
processed products, because theff Community's
offer is based on duty-free entry 
- 
up to certain
limits 
- 
for all industrial products of the developing
countries.
5. Finally, in a situation where the Community
is torn between its commitments to the Eighteen
and its commitments to the Third World as a
whole, we have the opening of negotiations with
the United Kingdom. This event, in itself a good
thing, is .another source of uncertainty for the
AASM; they would like to know what conditions
the Community will ofier the English-speaking
African countries in the Commonwea-lth, most of
whose products are competitive with those of the
Eighteen and some of whom may also need to
call on the financial und technical cooperation of
the Community. It is therefore difficult to assess
what effects the opening up of the Community
will have on the Association itself.
-a
6. In conclusion, it is more necessary than ever
that the 24 partners .fterrJd keep closest watch on
the development of the Association and keep
control of it, and that the six Member States in
particular should make known their options and
the nature of the cooperation they intend to extend
in the future.
CHAPTER I
THE INSTITUTIONS
7. An aaalÿsis of the decisions taken by the
Association Committee on the trânsitiona-l provi-
sions discussed in the ûrst part of thè General
Report shows that in practice the Association
Committee has come to take the place of the
Associaiion Council. kideed 'the latter held no
meetings at all between 29 May 1969 and 30 Septem-
ber 1970, i.e. over a period of sixteen months. This
seems hardly consistent \4,ith the provisiôns of
the Yaoundé Convention, Article 44 of which lays
down that the Council shall meet once a year.
8. Had the Council ôf Association not delegated
certain po\ryers to the Association Committee, as a
result of which the latter was able to take important
decisions and so keep the 
.Association operating
normally, the Council might have laid itsèff open
to a charge of shirking its responsibilities.
In fact, it is eqcouraging to see what has been
done by the Committee. At its meeting of 17 Julÿit approved the.Sixth Report on the Activities of
the Council of Association and-fôr the first time
in years-sent it punctually to the Joint Committee
and its Rapporteur. The cooperation of the joint
secretariat of the Council made possible not only
6
the prompt adoption of the Sixth Report but also
its transmission to the parliamentary bodies of the
Association.
As Mr. Damiba, the President of the Association
Council, explained before the Joint Committee in
Libreville (r) it is still the Council that has the
ultimate political responsibility. The powers it has
delegated since 1964 to the Association Committee
do not relieve the Council of its political responsibi-
lity because at each of its sessions it has to express
its opinion on the reports submitted by the Asso-
ciation Committee on the matters it has dealt with.
9. The long-awaited meeting of the Association
Council on 30 September was rather a disappoint-
ment for two reasons: one was the absence of some
European und some African Ministerd; the other
was the fact that the consultations held about
tariff changes the EEC envisages for some tropical
products showed how hard it is for the AASM to
convince their European friends of the validity of
some of their basic claims. Indeed the AASM.were
unable to get the Six to change their minds.
This consultation procedure between the Six
and the Eighteen should be reviewed to ensure
that the AASM viewpoint really exercices some
influence on the Association Council's final decision.
In fact the debates have always left the AASM
with the impression that when the Six have come
to an agreement beforehand the AASM are faced
with a lait accompli, because the agreement then
The Council meeting did, on the other hand,
prove more satisfactory when it came to the consul-
tations between the Six and Eighteen on generalized
preferences. The Community âcceded to a request
cjf the Associated States to include, in its ofier, a
general clause to the efiect that the Côminunitÿ
and the developed countries would redress any
unfavourable situation that the introduction of the
system of generalized preferences might produce in
the developing countries at present enjoying special
preferences.
Similarly the Association Council vyelcomed the
information given by the Community about the
applications for membership of the United King-
dom, Denmark, Iréland and Norway and about the
Community's attitude on their implicatiôns for the
policy of the Association.
L0. Relations between the various bodies of the
Association have gone satisfactorily because all
have kept in constant touch with each other,
thanks to the active participation of representatives
of the Association Council and of the European
Cornmission at meetings of the Jdint Committee.
I
:
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(1) The Joint Comittæ held two meetings in 1970, thè fiÎst itr Flrmæ
from 20 to 23 May ud tJre second in Libreyille frôm 28 to 30 Octobq.
I
11. A major change has taken place within the
Commission, the linchpin of the Association: the
Governments of the 24 Associates can only join with
the members of the parliamentary bodies of the
Association in regretting the departure of Mr.
Rochereau who was completely dedicated to the
cause of the Association and enjoyed the confidence
of all the AASM.
An encouraging factor, on the other hand, is
that the new member responsible for relations
with the Eighteen, Mr. Jean François Deniau,
has a wide experience of Africa and is also the
Community's negotiator with the four States that
have applied for membership. This promises well
for the Association because there is no doubt that
the Community's 'negotiator' will throughout the
negotiations bear in mindthe problems of the AASM
for which he is one of the perEons responsible.
CHAPTER II
THE PREFERENTIAL SYSTEM OF THE
ASSOCIATION
12. The Association'ssystemofregionalpreferen-
ces has caused so much controversy in the third
countries that it may be worthwhile explaining
what the actual content of the AssoôiationÈ
preferential policy now is.
The system of free trade areas between the
Community and each of the 18 AA,SM countries,
based on preferences amounting to more than
straightforward tariff concessions, is evolüng all
the time and has undergone major changes since
1960.
13. In 1958 the trade policy instituted between
the Community and the States (then the African
and Malagasy territories) was mainly French-
inspired, both out of necessity and because of
current attitudes. As the preferential system of
the Association stemmed from historic links, it
brought with it originally not only major tariff
concessions (i.e. duty-free entry for products
exported by the AASM) but also marketing and
price guarantees on Community markets, products
of the associated countries being regarded as Com-
munity products. Conversely the privileged treat-
ment given to France in the African territories at
the time entirely dependent on it was extended
to its five partners which thus benefited from the
same preferences (reserve preferences).
14. As from 1960, the horizontal relationship
that had linked most of the AASM together
within the same economic area disappeared with
their accession to independence. In 1963, when
the First. Yaoundé Convention was sigrred, produc-
tion aid was intended to be phased out by means
of.a gradual reduction in price support for the
main AASII products; it was agreed that when
Yaoundé I expired on 30 June 1969 the AASM
ought to be in a position to aliga their product
prices on world prices.
At the purely tariff level there were then a
series of reductions in the common customs tariff
(CCT) following mlutilateral negotiations in GATT
-the Dillon Round and then the Kennedy Round
-of as much as an average of 25 per cent for mostproducts and a 15 per cent suspension for coffee
and cocoa, with the application ahead of schedule
of a reduced CCT rate for these products. There was
also a complete suspension of the CCT for tea and
tropical woods. Then again, there was no tariff
protection for certain primary commodities such
as oleaginous seeds, cotton and rubber, where the
CCT duty was nil.
A. The new tariff reductions on primary
commodities
15. The signature of Yaoundé II provided the
opportunity to lay down a-nother milestone in the
process of tariff dismantlement within the Associa-
tion. When consultations took place on the Council
on 30 September 1970, the Community conf,rmed
its intention of making partial suspensions in the
CCT on several tropical products, including three
that matter totheAASM-coflee,cocoa and palrn
oil (r)-and other products (coconut, pepper,
cinnamon, ging"r (') etc.) (see list in Annex II to
the Sixth General Report, Doc. 32/I-II).
16. These tariff changes were one aspect of the
negotiations leading to the renewal of Yaoundé I;
as stated in the annual report, it was at the third
meeting of the Contracting Parties at ministerial
level on 29 May 1969, and at the sixth meeting
of 13 June 1969 of the Contracting Parties at
ambassadorial level, that the Associated States were
officially informed that the Member States wanted
to make a 'gesture' on behalf of the developing
third countries.
This point was made in June by representatives
of certain Member States when the Council of the
Six discussed the desirability of reducing the CCT
on cinnamon and tung oil. Somedelegationswanted
the EEC to refrain ffom reducing the CCT so as
not to harm Madagascar which exports these
products to the Community, its main customer,
but two delegations of the Member States found
this unacceptable and stressed that this CCT
reduction had been regarded as final, as indicated
(1) SEIreEion of duty
- 
oE uoæted æffee, from 9.6 to 7o/o, subjæt to the edstenæ md
proper opemtion of the intmatlo[al agreEæt on æfiæ;
- 
oE @â beæ trom 5.4 to Ao/oi
- 
on pdm oil from I to 6 0/6.
(à) Howevc, tùe Cormmity dæided to make uo chmge iû tùe CCT for
tutrg oll md to effect a ls appræiable suspflslon of the CÇT for clma-
mo[.
iii-i;i---- -
i
'f
I
in the explanatory statement attached to Yaoundé
II, as outlined before the German and Dutch
Parliaments.
17. The Community would thus be hard put to
go back on this gesture because it was regarded
by some as one of the conditions for the renewal
of Yaoundé I. For the Community it was a worth-
while demonstration of its. sense of responsibility
towards the Third World as a whole and a sop to
some of the other industrialized countri'es, partic-
ularly the United States, which take issue with'
the preferential policy of the Association.
It was thanks to the Commission.that the Com-
munity decided to limit this gesture so as not to
damage the interests of the Associated States.
.18. At meetings of the Contracting Parties 
-andas early as 26 March 1969-the AASM came out
strongly against any plan to reduce CCT duties,
as indicated in the Sixth General Report (pp.
31-32): 'In their opinion the tariff dismantlement
measures introduced since the Rome Treaty was
signerl in 1958 have harmed their commercial
interests. Coming on top of the disappearance of
a privileged market where most of these States
enjoyed price and marketing guarantees for their
products, these measures would even have dealt a
severe blow to their export revenue and to the
commercia-l footing acquired on these priüleged
markets of the Europe of the Six.
'For the Associated States there is a connection
between the succession of CCT reductions on the
main tropical products made since 1958 and the
sharp fall in their exports of some of these products
to the Community (unroasted coffee 141 million
units of account in f967 as compared vrith 160
millions u.a. in 1958), or the negligible increase in
exports of others (53 million u.a. for bananas in
1967 as compared \Mith 48 milllion u.a. in 1958).
Over the same period the EEC's imports of un-
roasted coffee from Latin America increased by
more than 30 per cent and banana imports from the
same source by more than 100 per cent.
'Palm oil is another case in point; the Associated
States felt that it would be wrong to reduce the
duty fnom 9 to 6 per cent. They pointed out that
between 1960 and 1965 their exports of palm oil
to the Community decreased appreciably both in
quantity and in va-Iue-from 131,000 tons or $30.5m
to 101,500 tons or $25.4m. EEC imports from
third countries, on the other hand, rose substantial-
ly-from 135,000 tons, or $30m, in 1960 to 162,000
tons, or $42.5m, in 1965.
The Associated States argued that any measure
involving the suspension of duty on this product
would adversely affect the export receipts of some
Associated States-particularly the Democratic
Repubüc of the Congo, the Republic of Dahomey
and the Ivory Coast Republic-because palm oil
is a major feature of their export trade.'
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19. On this evid.ence, the AASM have proved
their point that the tariff suspensions already
made had weakened their export capability on the
markets of the Six; it is therefore lor the Communi-
ty and the bodies of the Association to take all
appropriate steps to redress the damage sufiered
by the AASM().
The fact remains that it would be difficult for
the Community to go back and readjust its common
customs tariff; this would be bound to provoke
very strong reactions from third countries.
20. The Associated States note with regret that
in signing Yaoundé II the Community again
weakened the preferences system enjoyed by
them. This undoubtedly conû.rms that the trend is
gradually to reduce Association preferences.
21. The unbi4sed conclusion that follows from
this is that there has been a steady whittling away
of the grounds for criticism by third countries
because the Association is detnitely bent on
dismantling its trade and tariff preferences. It can
hardly be said that the Associates have consolida-
ted their ünks in this sphere. It would rather
appear that the links betweenthe?4 partners have
changed, the emphasis shifting from trade protec-
tion on a steadily decreasing scale to greater
ûnancial and technical cooperation, which is
tending to become the major feature of the As-
sociation between the 18 and the Six. The As-
sociation ought to watch this development care-
fully to ensure that it does not go too quickly,
bearing in mind the overriding importance of
trade policy for the AASM.
B. Extension to the three East African countries of
preferences already granteil to the AASM
22. The Arusha II Agreement came into force
at the same time as Yaoundé II. The effects of
this competition for the AASM will thus begin
to be felt this year because Arusha I never came
into effect.
Indeed the proüsions of the Arusha Agreement
relating to trade agreements are identical with
those of Yaoundé II and provide for duty-free
entry into the Community of products originating
in East Africa. It was in this way that the
Community manifested its concern to give the
three East African countries the same import
system as that applied to AASM products. In
the case of three products, however, Protocol II
to the Agreement lays down certain safeguard
clauses should imports of coffee,'cloves and canned
.pineapples exceed the following quantities during
any given year:
(1) The Commity made it dtr that it would male tæifi 'suspensions'
æd aot ûnal reductiom in its cmtom tæifi I as to be able to reüew
the situatioE if it were proved that the iDteræts of the Asæiated Stat6
had really bm prejudiced.
- 
'-.'-l
(i ) Unroasted coflee, 56,000 tons;
(ii ) Cloves, 120 tons;
(iii) Canned pineapples, 860 tons.
In that case 'the Community shall be authorized
-subject to consultation with the Partners Statesof the East African Community, to take the
necessary measures to avoid serious disturbances
in traditional trade flows'(1). 
l
23. Similarly, the system for imports from East
Africa of agricultural products similar to and
competitive with European products, subject to
market regulatioh, is the same as that in the
Yaoundé Convention(z). In both Conventions
Article 1,2 of Protocol No. 1 states that 'the
treatment which the Community applies to these
products shall be more favourable than the general
treatment appüed to like products originating in
third countries.' The regulation implementing this
Article, submitted by the Commission of the
Communities to the Council, is designed to bring
imports of agricultural products from East Africa
freely into line with those from the AASM and to
accord the same privileges.
24. The AASM welcomed, and continue to
welcome, the Association of the three countries of
East Africa with the Community because they
feel that it will be conducive to African unity and
regional cooperation through the possibiüty it
holds out of enlarging the free trade areas that
already exist in Africa.
This does not mean they are unaware of the
difficulties they could be faced with as a result of
competition from East African products on Com-
munity markets. This applies to tropical products
for which demand is not very elastic in the European
consumer countries where the AASM are already
meeting with keen competition from the Latin
American countries.
25. And it will particularly apply to agricultural
products similar to and competitive with European
products. In view of the protectionist nature of
the common agricultural policy it is to be feared
that the exportable quantities of such agricultural
products Trom East Africa may, coming on top
of those of the AASM, alarm the Community and
drive it to,'adjust' its regulations relating t9 pro-
ducts originating in Associated African States
accordingly, v/ith a view to safeguarding its
interests as enüsaged in Protocol No. 1 annexed
to the Convention.
This fear is not wholly unjustiûed, for example,
in'the case of the import system recently proposed
by the Commission for imports of. maize from the
Associated African States. As the East African
countries were major potential exporters the
Community proposed a 'preference' reducing the
l"ry(,) by 0.10 u.a. per 100 kg; the resulting
concession would be equà to 2.8 per cent of the
levy, a negligible amount. Never before has the
Community granted such a paltry concession to
the AASM. When this problem was debated in the
European Parliament it clearly emerged that the
Community was alarmed at the possibility of large
tonnages being imported from East Africa. It
could have been much more liberal in its regulations
had it only had to take the small-scale eiports of
the AASM into account, as it does in the case of other
products the Community imports from the AASM
in small quantities(a).
26. To sum up, gling East Africa the same
system for the imports of agricultural products as
the AASM-however desirable this may be-is
liable to result in a less favourable system for
certain AASM exports to the Community than
before.
C. UNCTAD's generalized preferences for the
manufactures and semi-manufactures of the
developing countries
27. The system of generalized preferences is
scheduled to come into operation during the course
of 1971.
This system is as it were the second component
of the reduction in the preferential poncessions
enjoyed by the AASM. The Community offer is
based on duty-free entry for all the developing
countries. AASM products will thus no longer
enjoy a privileged position-vis-à-üs third coun-
tries-onCommunity markets,except in so far as
third countries will have to respect certain export
ceilings.
28. Unlike the suspension of duties pn certain
AASM tropical exports, however, the granting of
generalized preferencesdoes not corne as a surprise
to the AASM. Indeed the Eighteen have never
raised any objection to the introduction of a
system of mutually acceptable generalized preferen-
ces; they went all the way with the group of 77
developing countries on the general principle of
such preferences during the discussions at UNCTAD
and when Resolution lllzl was unanimously
adopted by the 132 participating countries in New
Delhi. l
29. In accordance with Protocol No, 4, the
Community got in touch with the AASM at
(1) It should b€ Eoted that thæ ceilings were set fairly high æd allow fo! a
gradual incæe in tie exports of Eæt Aîrie, beæiag tr mind ttre
prëæt level of e4rerts of the tbæe products to tàe ComEity.
(â) See Articles 2,3 ûd 4 of the Arusha Àgræment which æe the same
æ Articlæ 2,3 ud 4 of the Yaomdé Convention.
(8) The Cotmuity levy is a tu on imtrprts of cutain agricultual products.
It is equal to the difiænæ betwæn the iatemal lrics guæmteêd toprodum in the Comuity md world prim.
(a) Kenya æd Tmia exported 74,000 tons of maize to the Co]rmuity
in 1968; the AASM exported ody 818 tons,
rl
UNCTAD and consulted them officially on several
occasions, among them the meeting of the As-
sociation Council on 30 September 1970. The
Associated States were informed in March 1969
about the nature of the preliminary offer made by
the Community to the OECD on the system of
generalized preferences it proposed to apply for
its own purposes (See.General Report, pp.37-39):
'- 15 I general rule this preferential treatment
will apply to all the manufactures and semi-
maaufactures in Chapters 29 to 99 of the
B'russels Nomenclature where these originate in
the developing countries;
'- the preference will consist in granting duty-
free entry;
'- preferential imports will be admitted up to
' ceilings calculated on the basis of value in the
case of each product by reference to standard
criteria for all products;
'- in order to restrict the scope of the preferences
granted to the most competitive developing
country or countries and to keep a major
proportion for the least competitive, preferential
imports from a single developing country for
a given product should not as a general rule
exceed 50 per cent of the ceiling set for the
product in question.
'The annual ceilings would normally be worked
out according to the following formula: c.i.f. value
of imports from the beneficiary country (basic
amount) plus 5 per cent of the va.lue of c.i.f. imports
from other countries (additional amount).
'As regards processed agricultural products the
Community would grant tarifi preferences on some
of them (shown in a limitative list annexed to the
communication) and involving mainly products
concerning the Member States. Some of these pro-
ducts are also of importance to the Associated
States (pyrethrum, saps and extracts, tapioca,
roasted nuts and fruits without alcohol and with
added sugar). However, in the case of most of the
major products exported by the AASM (manioc
flour, products processed from pineapple, cofiee
and cocoa, spices) the Communityhas notponsidered
any concession.
'As regards the safeguard mechanism, this is the
direct result-in the case of the industrial products
-of the system of predetermined import ceilingschosen by the Cornmunity. In the case of processed
agricultural products, on the other hand, a special
safeguard mechanism will come into operation. The
purpose of the ceilings systems is to protect the
industries of the Member Stâtes and the AASM
again5l excessive competition from developing
third countries. These ceilings will not apply to
exports to the EEC by the AASM who will still
be completely exempt from customs duties without
any quagrtitative restriction.'
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30. The AASM broadly supported the system
proposed by the Community although it did not
meet their request to exclude such sensitive agri-
cultural products as manioc tapioca, although it
did so for a similar product of interest to the Member
States, viz products processed from potato starch.
On the other hand. the Community supported
the AASM at UNCTAD when it decided to include
in the system of generalized preferences a general
proüsion-covering both industrial and agricultural
products-to the efiect that the developed countries
would redress arry unfavourable situation caused
by the introduction of this system in any of the
developing countries at present enjoying preferences
in some developed countries. The interests of the
AASM could thus be taken into account if sensitive
products like tapioca and canned products processed
from fruit and vegetables, hides,skins and leather,
were threatened following the introduction of the
system.
This provision did not meet with any objection
from the developing countries as a whole because it
went back to a proposal adopted by the 'Group
of 77' both when the Algiers Charter was being
drawn up and at the New De1hi Conference. But
at the last meeting of the Special Committee on
Preferences in Geneva the United States stated it
could not acccept this clause; the Special Committee
was thus obliged to drop it. The spokesman for the
European Communities stated that the text on
special preferences did not quite measure up to
the wishes expressed by the 'Group of 77' and that
the Community reserved the right to take any
necessary measures, within the framework of its
offer, to offset any adverse consequences the appli-
cation of the general system of preferences might
have for the countries associated with the Com-
munity.
Similarly, the Community agreed to continuous
consultations between the 24 Associates ( in accord-
ance with the proüsions of ProtocolNo.6)through-
out all the negotiations.
31. Regardless of the Community's offer and in
view of the impossibility of winning over all the
industrialized States to â uniform ofier, the trehd
is now towards the introduction of different systems
of preferences (EEC, United Kingdom, United
States, Japan, Nordic countries, etc.).
It is important for the AASM to know what
practical advantages they will gain from generalized
preferences when the markets of the major indus-
trialized States, apart form the EEC, are opened up
to their processed products. It is particularly im-
portant for them to be able to see whether these
prospects of new markets will offset the competition
they will meet with on Community markets from
the processed products exported by the developing
countries that are more advanced economically
and whose products are therefore more competitive
than their own.
32. A recent study of the draft system of gener-
alized preferences(l) made by the Economic
Commission for Africa-with the help of GATT and
UNCTAD stafi-on the basis of the various offers
made by the OECD countries, shows that the least
advanced of the developing countries will get little
or nothing from the system of generalized preferen,
ces whereas the most prosperous and the most
advanced among them will gain appreciable bene-
fits. The study highlights how little this system will
help the development of the African countries. The
conclusions of the Economic Commission for Africa
are as follows:
(") The total extra receipts that all the African
countries concerned can expect from general-
ized preferenceswouldonly amount to 914.5m
per annum. If in addition the United States
sticks to its original decision not to offer
generalizsfl preferences to countries that are
parties to preferential agreements-i.e. those
associated with the EEC or which are members
of the Commonwealth-then 9370,000 must
be deducted from this figure. Since one also
has to deduct the value of special preferences
relating to products included in the system of
generaüzed preferences (estimated to be worth
$3.5m for the three North African countries
associated with the EEC and approximately
$90,000 for East Africa) the total amount of
extra receipts for all the African countries
concerned would actually come to gl0.5m per
annum;
(b) Seven African countries would stand to gain
nothing at all;
(.) More than haff of the developing countries in
Africa, comprising a quarter of the population,
would each receive ldss than 910,000; these
are the poorest countries which together ac-
count for only 18 per cent of the total gross
national product of the region;
(d) In monetary terms it follows that the 23 coun-
tries, where the GNP is around 988 per in-
habitant, would get 0.04 US cents per inhabit-
ant per annum;
(e) Only four African countries would each get
more than a million dollars per annum, which
is equivalent to 15 US cents per inhabitant.
33. The conclusions of the Economic Commission
for Africa about the AASM are particularly
disturbing:
(r) None of the AASM would get more than half
a million dollars arrd approximately two-thirds
would get less than 910,000. The AASM could
in fact only expect to beneflt to the extent of
$1.1m a year, those of the Commonwealth
$6.2m and the other African countries 97.2m;
(1) 'Iæ prcjet de slstèrc de préféræ6 géiémlæ et ies payF afriaim,
Unlted Natiom 
- 
Emomic æd Sæial Coucil, sth Jolnt MêêtiDg of
the Economic Coluidon for Âfrie, M 70-1532, Àugut 1970.
(b) Summing up, the ECA concludes that to make
a complete economic assessment of the system
one has to take into account the reactions of
competing exporters. The exporting industrial-
ized States might cut their prices if they
feared losing any considerable part of the
market. Consequently the gain in terms of
price could be less than the preferential margin.
There could also be a change in the competitive
position of the exporting developing countries
already enjoying preferences, i.e. those associa-
ted with the EEC and those in the Common-
wealth. Their preferential situation would
come to an end when the general system of
preferences came into operation. If these
factors are borne in mind when the assessment
is made it could turn the calculated negligible
or nil benett in terms of the receipts of these
countries into a net loss. The markets they
have already gained through special preferences
are liable to be threatened and their expected
but not yet guaranteed access to new màrkets
could be challenged or even blocked as a result
of keener competition from other developing
countries (sec. 43).
34. Lastly, the Economic Commission for Africa
considers that the aim of Resolution No. 21(II)
at the second session of UNCTAD (on accelerating
the development of the developing countries,
especially the least advanced among them) could
only be achieved if other measures were taken in
addition to the system of generaliz.ed preferences-
that is, so as to take into account the special prob-
lems of the leastadvanced countries, onthegrounds
that at the present stage in the discussions of
generalized preferences it would be hard to imagine
a more unfair way of distributing aid among the
developing countries.
35. After this ECA study came the conclusions
of the UNCTAD Special Committee on Preferences
of 11 October 1970. These show that:
1. In contrast towhat was originally envisaged in
New Delhi it has not been possible to estabüsh
a singl,e contractual charter freely negotiated
between the developed and the developing
countries; instead different systems of conces-
sions granted by each of the donor countries at
their own discretion are to be introduced;
2. The exceptions hedging the offers of the devel-
oped countries show that the system brings
practieally no beneût to the least advanced
countries because it vdll be a long time before
they export heavy equipment and other capital
goods. It is therefore hard to understand why
the United States and Japan, for example, should
have excluded from their offers products the
AASM could export such as footwear, certain
textiles and oil products;
3. The AASM would have no guaranteed àccess to
the markets of the United States and Japan,
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4.
for example, because the USA and some other
countries have Linked this problern with that
of the abolition of reverse preferencep. The
conclusion of the Special Committee'is that
consultations should be hêld asi soon as possible
between the parties ürectly concerned so, as to
work out ârrangements before the intrr:duction
of the system of generalized preferences. In this
connexion the AASM would have to negotiate
bilaterally with the Unitèà States, Austria,
Japan and Switzerland, all of whose offers are
subject to the abolition of reverse preferences,
about the conditions governing such abolition(1).
The vast number of safeguard mechanisms
embodied in the various ofiers and the fact that
each donor country has decideô to stick to its
own deflnition of the term 'products originating
in...' leads one to expect serious practical
difficulties when it comes to the application of
the measures enacted.
One of the shortcomings in the arrangements
made is the failure to draw up a single list of the
countries to enjoy these preferences. Each
developed country has in fact reserved the
right itself to specify the countries that will
benefit from this system.Thus the four developed
countries whose offers are made subject to the
abolition of reverse preferences could exclude
the AASM if the proposed consultations were
not successfully concluded in the near future.
Similarly it was not only the members of the
'Group ol 77' that claimed the right to general-
ized preferences; other çountries such as Ruma-
nia, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Turkey, Israel,
Greece, Spain and, acting for Hong Kong, the
United Kingdom did sô too.
The special measures on behalf of the least
developed countries were not stipulated by
the donor countries as a whole. Nor did any
action ensure from the condition laid down by
the African States, and then taken up by all
the 77, that equivalent benefits should be
extended to the developing countries enjoying
special preferences in certain industrialized
countries before they could accept the abolition
of the preferences that they formerly enjoyed
for their manufactures. The only reference in
the chapter .on special measures is the follow-
ing:
'Where possible, and from case to case, the donor
countries will try and include products of export
interest to the least advanced of the developing
countries in the generalized preference schemes,
and grant greater tarifi reductions for such
products.'
(l) Às a r6ult of the lmitim adopted by the Uuited Stats ud other donor
- 
@utri6, Jæie æd-Trinidad æal Tobago, statèd at the clGing s-
sim ôf the SIEial C@mittæ that they alid rot uvisage abolishing e
væ 1reIre for the time belag æd wæ Dot able to give their agræ-Emt to tlle fl[al mcluim of the Comittæ, tæing in mind tùe rei-
vatiom made by some of the dmor ountriæ which would erclude thm
from the major ind$trial mækets.
72
This clause, hedged as it is with all these reserva-
tions, is hardly binding on the donor countries
and in no !ÿay offers a guarantee to the AASM.
Similarly, although the conclusions of the
Special Committee on Preferences were accepted
by the AASM, this does not bring the discussions
to an end because certain important conditions
for the application of the system will still have
to be negotiated bilaterally; thus they have
not yet been endorsed by the AASM;
7. The American ofier has moreover still to be
ratified by the United States Congress, and it is
quite likely that in the present protectionist
atmosphere this will take some time yet and it
is not even certain that it will be done at all.
Because the Community said that is was ready
to apply the system as soon as possible a serious
imbalance could immediately arise both in the
timing and in thé very nature of the ofiers. The
United States has excluded most textiles and
other products of interest to the AASM from
its offer, and is preparing quantitative
restrictions on these products which will apply
to exports from all countries including those of
the Community.
Consequently exports of these products from
all the developing countries will pour into the
Community, which is already hard put to protect
. itself, behind its common customs tariff, against
such established competitors as Japan and
Hong Kong.
Thus.the 'generous' initiative taken by the Com-
munity regarding generalized preferences is
Iiable to involve certain dangers both for the
Eighteen and to the Community itself if it is
not followed by equivalent offers by other
industrialized States.
Practically speaking, the system of generalizsd
preferences'proposed in New Delhi will be of
little worth unless the ofiers of donor countries
are equivalent and come into force simultane-
ously; otherwise the system will be thrown
out of balance and adversely affect those that
are giving the most-in this case the Community
and its Associates.
The Community cannot lose sight of this aspect
of the problem at subsequent §iscussions on
the UNCTAD Council. The sirnul'taneows entry
into force of the aariows systerns appears to be an
i.ndispensable cond.ition of their applicability. It
seems obvious that the Community must at least
wait until the four countries which have made
conditional offers'are able to apply the system
they themselves have proposed.
36. We quote as an example a draft resolution
proposed by the lvory Coast, on behalf of the
African Group, before the UNCTAD Council's
Committee o., in,risible transactions and financing
at its meeting in July. This included the following
suggestions on the nature of the special, fixeasures
which couldbe taken in favour of the least advanced
countries:
6.
3.
I. That measures should be taken a^s soon as
possible to eliminate or red.uce the tariff and
non-tariff obstacles to trade in primâry comrho-
dities the export of which is of special interest
to the least advanced of the developing coun-
tries; and that to achieve this objective the
studies already made on this subject by other
international bodies that deal with the problems
of trade in primary commodities should be
taken into account;
That the developed countries concerned should
refrain-in order to allow the greatest possible
increase in export opportunities for the least
advanced countries-from any national agri-
cultural production that is uneconomic and
would have to be supported by a high level of
customs protection or by subsidies; and that
these countries should take due account of the
restrictive efiects which such support poücies
have on the exports of products of special
interest to the least developed countries;
That the developed countries should take partid-
ular account, as regards the production ,of
synthetic products or substitutes, of the inter-
ests of the least advanced countries which pro-
duce natural products, and that they should
give the utmost consideration to the interests of
these countries when it comes to marketing
agricultural surpluses;
That favourable treatment should be granted
to the least advanced countries when apportion-
ing production or export quotas under anyinter-
national arrangement afiecting products of
special interest to them; and that these arrange-
ments should, wherever possible, include special
conditions in favour of the least advanced
countries-foi example, a 'clause exempting
them from contributing towards financing
buffer stocks;
That special frnancial assistance and appropriate
technical aid should be given to the least advan-
ced countries to help them with production and
magketing so as to make them more competitive
in international trade in primary commodities;
The Committee calls on the Secretary-General
of UNCTAD to take, as a matter of priority,
in cooperation with the other United Nations
bodies and on the basis of the rnethod advocated
in Section III of the Secretariat's report con-
tained in Doc. TD/B/C. 1/13, any measure
likely to faciütate appücation of the recommen-
dations set out above, which would gradually
lead to an inérease in the exports of the least
advanced countries, to an improvement in their
terms of trade and, above a1l, in their export
receipts.
It is hardly necessary to add that these African
proposals were not exactly welcomed by the prospe-
rous countries d.uring the discussions on UNCTAD's
specialised committee.
D. Final comments
37. In the light of the rather disappointing
picture that emerges from the study made by the
Economic Commission for Africa and of the con-
clusions of the Special Committee on Preferences
adopted in Geneva on 1l October, gne cannot but
point out that the system, which is scheduled to
run for ten years, is being introduced at a time
when the AASM are planning to accelerate their
io6r.lfialization and therefore need guaranteed
privileged markets to protect their emergent indus-
tries. Just as the AASM no longer enjoy either price
guarantees or assured markets for their primary
commodities and tropical products, so too they will
have to contend with the keen competition of the
more advanced developing countries in marketing
their manufactures and semi-manufactures.
38. One may also ask what will be left of the
Association iJ 
- 
under pressure from the United
States, for example-the AASM werê to go back
on the reverse preferences that they grant the
Community and to follow the Community along
the path of tariff reductions.
39. Lastly it may be asked what would happen
if all the EEC-AASM preferences were abolished
because trad.e between the Eighteen and the Six
has increased less over the last decade than trade
between the Community and the other developing
countries. The tarifi protection measures are indeed
inadequate on their own to stimulate trade; but
the trade promotion measures provided for in the
new Convention, and which are supposed to take
the place of tariff concessions, will only make them-
selves felt gradually-at the very best in a few
years' time, despite the efiorts already made by
the Commission of the Communities.
CHAPTER III .
TRADE
A. The development of trade between the partners
of the Association and with certain thiril countries
40. For the second year running AASM exports
to the Community seem to have expanded satisfac-
torily: from $1,466m in 1968 to $1,717m in 1969,
an increase of 17 per cent(l). In comparison with
1967-when the AASM exports fell by 1 per cent
in value-the increase was around 30 per cent.
The exports of Latin America to the Community
also increased but to a lesser de§ree, i.e. by 14.4
per cent. Only the exports of the non-associated
African countries expanded more quickly than
those of the AASM, i.e. by approximately 45 per
(1) In the frÉt eight mônths of l97O AASM qports mo"dted to $ 1,289m æ
æmpæd with S 1,129m for thempondingFriodln 1989, minææ
of 14 per cmt (or 33 pm mt by æEpilistr with 1968).
4.
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This means that the AASM benefrted from the
general expansion in world trade in 1968 and 1969
in common with most of the other developing
countries. This favourable trend in the trade of the
developing côuntries was due to the expansion of
industrial production in the major States in 1968
and 1969, particularly the EEC and Japan where the
biggest increases occurred.The economii overheating
in most of thê industriatized countries and thè
speculative nature of international-currency fluc-
tuations helped to stimulate demand for primary
commodities and led to a more favourable trend in
the prices of many primary products (see secs.
60 to 65).
The upward trend continued during the first
eight months of 1970 although to a lesser degree(I)..
It should be remembered that in 1969 AASM exports
to the EEC developed particularly well.
4L. It would also appear that the diversiûcation
of AASM economies has enabled them to ofier new
products to add to their establishedexports.This is
particularly true of rapidly expanding countries
like the Ivory Coast and Cameroon. There has also
been an increasing diversiûcation of markets, both
in the Member States and in third countries.
An analysis of AASM exports to the Community
shows that those to the Belgium-Luxembourg
Economie Union increased the most sharply(f28 per cent) by comparison with 1968; exports
to Italy and the Netherlands also increased appre-
ciably (f24 per cent); exports to Germany by 14
per cent. On the other hand exports to France, still
the highest in absolute value, rose at a much lower
rate (f9 per cent).
This trend towards a better spread of AASM
exports to the EEC continued during the first
eight months of 1970. During this period France's
share in the total exports arnounted to only 37 per
cent (53 per cent in 1964, 39 per cent in 1969)
whereas the relative share of the other countries
(particularly Belgium and ltaly) has steadily
increased.
Exports of the AASM to ühe EEC
Germany
France
Belgiumpur
Italy
Netherlands
42. The breakdown by country shorars that tradein general developed satisfactorily for all the
AASM, even though the situation vàried apprecia-
bly from one to another.
/
Most of the AASM increased their exports in
proportions varying from 7 per cent (Madagascar)
(r) In the liÉt eight Eonths of 19?O AASM exprts âEomted to gl,Z89m as
comlnred wltà $1,199m for the oreslnnding period iû 1969, æ lncrease
of 14 per mt (or 38 IrE mt by @mpæison with 1968).
t4
to 50 per cent (Mali, following the resumption ol
trade with France with the signiag of the new,
Franco-Mali monetary agreements in 1967). The
increase was particularly sharp in the case of Daho-
mey (f35 per cent), the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (a23 per cent), Gabon (f20 per cent),
Upp"r Yolta (t22 per cent) and Togo (f33 per
cent).
(§ ,niuim)
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43. Exforts of eack of the AASM to the EEC
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Da.homey
Gabon
Upper Volta
Madagascar
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Rwanda
Senegal
Somali
Chad
Togo
. Total AASM
U. On the other hand some States experienced
serious diffrculties which led to a fall in their
exÉorts: Chad (-13 per cent) following the fall in
coîton prices, Sènegal-(-9 pei cent) toU-owing tÉree
bad groundnut crops in succession(1). , t
The development of AASM exports to the
Community during the trst eight rnonths of 1970
brings out appreciable difierences from one country
to-another. The exports of three States decreased
by comparison urith the same pçriod fui 1969
(Republic of the Congo, 
-11 per cent; Mauritania,
-5 per cent; Chad, -4 per cent). Other countries ,managed to increase their exportô considerably(Mali, +85 per cent; Central Àfican Republic, ,f 64 per cent; Dahomey, {4I per cent; UpperVol-
ta, f35 per cent,; Democratic Republic of the Con-
go, +27 per cent; Burundi, l24 per cent). The
appreciable recovery in the trade of some countries
which have been experiencing a relatively slow
growth is encouraging.
Âs regards the nature of ÂASM exports it is
worth noting that these still consist to a large
extent of primary commodities (81 per cent) \ühere
+r3
they are still dependent on world prices for these
products.
45. AASM iTnports from the Community shgwed
a sizeable increase in value ($820m in 1964, 91,01 9m
in 1968 and $1,116m in 1969).
Since 1964 Italy, Germany and tle Netherlands
have become larger suppliers of tfre Associated
States. The Netherlands have altnosf tripled their
sales to the AASM ($SBm in 1964, $9f .am in 1969);
Italy has more than doubled its sâles ($4Om in
1964, $87m in 1969e); France, howeVer, increased
its exports by only 13.7 per cent Qver the same
period, even though these'stifl amount to about
63 per cent of total EEC exports to the AASM.
Dur,ing the first eight months of 1970 Member
'Statês' exports to the.AASM increased at roughly
the same rate (by 1l per cent) as compared with
the.ûrst eight months of 1969, France remaining
the main exporting country .(60 per cent). The
Netherlands, which made the most progreÀs in
1969, fell back to the level of thd corrdsponding
period in 1968.
1,717,r89
(1), Gfomilnüt orprts momted'to only 95,003 tons ln 1969'(4,0{4m Fm
CFA) as cmpared with 243,0@ tons (8,216 m Fs CFA) in 1967; opports
of mde md reûned olls: 116,134 tonE (0,160m frs CFA) as coEparcat
' with 198,000 tons (19,288m FÉ CFA); oil-cakæ: 188,540 toiu (31888m
Frs CFA) as æmlnred ÿ!1th 248,742 tons (5,4@m Frs CFA). f) Arcrdlng toûgrcItalÿs exlnrts to the
.givæ in the addendm to the Geûtral Report {p. 6)
AASM iacreased even more shaçply in 1968 ($9e.58).
($
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This trend ,towards greater diversification of
trade between the AASM a^nd each of the six Mem-
ber States is'very gïatifying and shows that the
' Exforts of the Mem,ber Slales to the AÀSM
4.6. Exforts of tha EEC to the AASM
Association is proûtable to all partners, including
the Member States which are to some extent
getting â 'fair return' on their contributions to the
EDF.
(î iltusand)
ÿ6 varlaüm
Smmths
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Smmths
1960
D€stlnatiotr
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Republic of the Congo
Democratic Repubüc of
the Congo
Ivory Coast
Da^homey
Gabon
Upper Volta
Madagascar
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Rwanda
Sedegal
Somalia
Chad
Togo
lotal AASM
The decrease in purchases from the Community
by some Associated States is to some extent due
to a general decrease in their imports aimed at
improving their.overall balance of trade. In the
case of Burundi the 25 per cent decrease in f969
is due to the fact that its imports from the Comrnu-
nity in 1968 increased at the exceptionally high
rate of 42 per cent as compared with the previous
year.
76
822,416 +lr
47. The Community's share in AASM purchases
was, however only 62.3 per cent of their total
imports in 1968, as compared \,ÿith 70.5 per cqnt
in f 962. This means that the AASM have diversiûed
their imports somewhat too.
The ûgurà given in Table IV of the addendurn
to the Sixth General Report show that the share
of the United Kingdom, USA and Japan in AASM
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purchases increased {rom 10 per cent in 1g60 to
13.5 per cent in 1968.
48. The United States more than doubled their
sales to the Associated States between 1960
($55m) and 1968 ($13f ,8). As a comparison, AASM
imports from the United States roughlÿ equal in
value those from the Federal Republic of Germany.
Taking 1961 as the base year (index: 100) AASM
imports from the United States rose to 209 in 1968
whereas those from the Community only went up to
151, with a tota.l value of 91,080m. Japanese exports
also rose sharply from index 100 in 1961 to 401
in 1968, representing a value of 941.1m. Similarly
the share of the other developing countries in
AASM imports has increased; this would appear to
indicate that inter-African trade is expandiag and
that there is now greater economic solidarity both
between the Associates and between the AASM
and their neighbours.
49. These different trends emerging from the
external trade figures of the AASM are a fairly
convincing reply to the criticism that the Association
is a neo-colonialist enterprise. Far from being self-
sufficient, there is no doubt that the Association
is contributing to the expansion of trade not only
internally but also between each of the Associates
and industrialized and developing third countries.
. As to the way the AASM balance of trade with
the Community is developing, this is not only active
but has continued to improve, with a real rate of
cover of imports by exports of 135 in 1968 as
compared with only 113 in 1962. For 1968, this
corresponds to exports of 91,331m against gl,080m
of imports from the Community.
B. The market for the main primary commotlities
of the AASM in 1968/69
50. On the whole the rate of expansion of AASM
exports to the EEC from 1968 to 1969 appears to
have been satisfactory(1). But one is obviously
dealing with an average which does not bring out
the wide differences from country to country and
from. product to product.
As shown by the following brief analysis of the
main products, mining products, especially copper,
are the biggest factor in this increase, whereas some
of the major agricultural products (coffee, bananas,
oleaginous products) stayed more or less at the
same level or even fell slightly below it. Only cocoa
and cotton showed a substantial increase.
Cofee
51. AASM coffee exports to the EEC decreased
by 4 per cent from 1968 to 1969, fallilg flsp
225,406 to 216,965 tons. Their value in 1969
($163.7m) was 3 per cent less than in 1968. Themain
cause seems to be that France purchased less.
After a sharp fall in the first six months of
1969, prices rose when frosts hit Parana in Brazil;
then they positively soared following the ravages
of leaf disease in BraztT. On the New York market
the price of robusta, which was still 30.40 cts/lb in
July 1969, went up to 43.07 cts/lb in April 1920 to
level off at around 42 to 43 cts/lb in September
1970. Following these increases the International
Coffee Agreement quotas and prices were reüsed
in August 1970 (robustas f 7 cts/fb). As a compari-
son, the purchasing price of cofiee from the Ivory
Coast for the 1970-71 marketing year was 105 Frs.
CFA per kilo as compared. wilti gS Frs CFA in
1969-70.
Cocoa
52. AASM sales of cocoa in the EEC increased
by 9 per cent from 168,630 tons in 1968 to 182,981
tons in 1969. In value this increase was particularly
impressive (f49 per cent) in view of the strong
demand for cocoa on the world market, (from
$114.3m to $170.6m). The market, which wasvery
buoyant, at times even chaotic, in 196g, slowed
down slightlyin 1970 because of uncertainty about
the production figures for the next marketing year.
Bananas
53. AASM banana exports to the Member States
fell back slightly in 1969 (from 254.348 tons in
1968 to 24b,896 tons in 1969, or 
-3 per cent). Thefall was even greater in value (-5 per cent) : from
$48.6m to $46.0m.
In 1969, however, the market was better than
might have been feared at the beginning of the
year because, contrary to general expectations, a
reasonable balance was maintained between supply
and demand on the world market. The prices of
Ivory Coast bananas on the French market held
fairly well (f2f-134 FF/kg) and reached some
fairly high peaks in 1970 before the seasonal sum-
mer fa-ll-ofi.
In 1969, as in previous years, 80 per cent of
AASM banana exports went to France through
the organization operating under the aegis of the
Comité interprofessionnel bananier which reserves
two-thirds of the French market for the Overseas
Departments and one third for the AASM. The
AASM are still experiencing great difiiculties in
penetrating the German market which, under the
Protocol annexed to the Rome Treaty, enjoyed a
nil duty quota of 596,000 tons exempt from the
CCT (20 per cent), and was able to obtain almost
all the supplies it needed from Latin America.
As in previous years, Germany asked the
Community to ilcrease this tariff quota. At the
Association Committee's consultations in June
the Cameroon delegate indicated that his country
was unable, to make any ofiers this year.(1) It would be pre@tw to extend the malysls to the ûGt motrths of 1970be@Ee the data for inttiüdual lnoducts æ not yet §gril@!t.
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The plan for redeveloping the banana industry
is being implemented and Cameroon thinks that
it \Àdlt be unable to offer any quantities before a
year or two. The offers submitted to Germany by
the Ivory Coast in previôus years never came to
anything commercially, and ithas had to look for mar-
kets elsewhere, in particular in the United Kingdom.
As a result it cannot make any new oflerstoGermany
this year. Lastly, in Madagascar the crops sufiered
from bad weather.
The AASM broadly stressed the diff,culties of
marketing African bananas in Germany although
they were not in a position to meet the conditions
laid down by that country.
On the European side efforts are still being made
to solve this problem, notably \Mithin the framework
of a Community regulation no\M in preparation.
Oleag'inows prodwcts
54. The Community's imports of shelled ground-
nuts from the AASM fell appreciably in 1969 as a
result of a drop in production in Senegal (from
362,483 to 250,604 tons 
-or 31 
per cent). For the
third year running drought caused serious d.ifficul-
ties in Senegal and the most recent crop in some
areas like Thies will be no better than 40 per cent
of that of 1969-70, which was itself lower than the
normal crop and amounted to only 750,000 tons.
On the other hand the price situation was such that
the fall in value could be kept down to 16 per cent
($56,956,000 to $47,657,000). As regards groundnut
oil the fall-off in tonnages was not so big (from
160,839 to 118,253 tons) and that in prices was still
sma-ller (from $41.fm to $37.7m, or 8 per cent).
The prices of edible oils were distinctly higher in
1968than in 1969 and the market was firm in 1970.
In the sector of concretes, the sales of AASM
palm kernel oils in the EEC were roughly the same
in 1969 as in 1968 (6I,422 tons in 1969 as against
62,025 tons in 1968) but in value there was a sharp
fall (from $11.6m to $8.9m). The same trend occur-
red regarding sales of palm oil (from 151,999 to
147,142 tons) where there was an even sharper fall
in value (from $29m to $25.5m). Exports of palm
kernel oil increased in volume (from 30,797 to
31,292 tons) but fell back in value (from $10.4m
to $8.7m).
As regards the market for palm kernel oil, there
was a distinct fall in prices in 1969 after the sharp
increase in 1968, and they only recovered towardi
the end of the year and in the ûrst few months
of 1970. Palm oil and palm kernel oil followed the
same pattern although prices were firmer towards
the end of 1970.
Cotton
55. AASM cotton exports to the EEC increased
by 10 per cent in 1969 from 88,397 to 97,464 tons,
the increase in value being from $52.9m in 1968
to 56.4m$ in f 969.
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The market was rather slow during the first
half of 1969 although prices picked up well in later
months: this recovery was maintained throughout
1970. The most recent estimates of a smaller Ameri-
can crop promise firm prices.
Although the cotton crops were good in certain
countries ]ike Cameroon-because of the abundant
rainfall, the increâsed use of fertilisers and greater
technical assistance, bad weather led to mediocre
harvests in 1969 in other countries such as the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Crwile ores
Iron ore
56. In 1969 AASM exports (from Mauritania)
increased from 4,796,000 tons (1968) to 5,681,000
tons (f 18 per cent). But the increase in value was
orüy 13 per cent (from $49.5m to $55.8m) following
the 4 per cent fall in price of iron ore decided upon
by Swedish and Venezuelan producers.
Mauritanian producers have decided to raise
their prices by 8 per cent for 1970.
Manganese ore
57. AASM exports increased from 511,896 tons
in 1968 to 648,407 tons in 1969 (+27 per cent) and
in value from $15.1m to $15.6m (fB per cent).
The market is rather difficult to follow because the
prices of the various ores differ withtheirmanganese
content.
1969 prices fell as a whole as a result of the
abundance of manganese deposits throughout the
world but ores with a high manganese content mined
at Moanda (Gabon) should not be at all difficult to
sell.
Tin ore
58. AASM tin ore exports to the EEC in f969
fell by one thousand tons (from 8,249 to 7,287 tons).
The fall in value \ryas, however, small (from $17.5m
to $17.2m) and was due to a tin shortage experien-
ced during the year which sent up prices from
d1,366 per ton in January 1969 to {f ,616 in the
following December.
Copper
59. AASM copper exports (Democratic Repubüc
of the Congo) increased from 300,198 to 325,556
tons (f8 per cent). In terms of value the trend was
even better, with a rise of 32 per cent (from $343m
to $452.9m).
The firm demand and the difficulties supply
had in keeping up with it led to a boom which
brought up electrolytic copper prices from d5l0 per
ton (London market) in January 1969 to d700
per ton in December. In April 1970 prices weie'still
fairly high ({660 per ton) but subsequently fell.
=----
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Zinc ores
60. AASM zinc exports went up from 72,577 tons
in 1968 to 76,049 tons in 1969 (from $3.8m to
$a.1m).
The price, which had been stable for several
years, rose lrom [ll2 per ton (London price) ip
January to d130 per ,ton in December. The rise
stopped in 1970 and prices fell back te .Â120 per ton
in May 1970.
Calciwrn phospkates
61.. Exports of phosphates (Senegal and Togo)
increased from l.6m tons in 1968 to 1.8m tons in
1969: their value followed closely (from $26.1m
to $28.9m).
Prices were fairly stable during 1969. The whole-
sale price on the French market has fallen by one
centime since January 1970 (new price: Frs. 104.2
per ton).
62. To sum up, the value of AASM exports of
ores increased in 1969 in the case of such products
as copper, phosphates and zinc ore because of the
rise ,in world prices: whereas exports of iron ore,
manganese ore and tin ore showed a slight fall in
vafue. The AASM producers who benefited from
this trend were:
- 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo: copper,
tin and zinc:
- 
Ivory Coast and Gabon: manganese ore;
- 
Mauritania: iron ore;
- 
Rwanda: tin ore;
- 
Senegal and Togo: phosphates.
63. The fairly good export performance of the
developing countries as a whole and of most of the
AASM in 1968 and 1969 (and probably in 1970 too)
has not stopped the deterioration in their terms of
trade.
According to a study on international trade
presented at the Ninth Session of the UNCTAD
Council(l), the terms of trade of the developing
countries improved slightly in 1968 as compared
with 1967 but were still 7 per cent lower than in
1960. The adverse variations in the terms,of trade
in the developing countries acted as a powerful
brake on the growth of the purchasing power of
their exports. In the case of most of these countries
this grovr.th rwas on average less than 2 per cent
between 1960 and 1966 and negative (-4 per cent)
in 1967. In 1968 it practically returned to the
2 per cent level. It is estimated that the average
annual loss suffered by the developing countries
between 1965 and 1968 because of the variation
of their terms of trade with the developed countries
amounted to $1,300m or one flfth of the public
funds received from the developed countries and
multilateral organizations. Although they made
modest gains from their exports during the three
years under review, the developing countries ex-
perienced increasingly serious losses on their
imports because import prices increased more
sharply than their export prices. These losses were
particutarly high in 1967 when the prices of their
imports were approximately 8 per cent higher than
the average for 1960 to 1964. A comparison of the
currency receipts of the developing countries in.
1967 and 1968 brings out three significant changes:
(r) A sharp increase in revenue from exports of
primary commodities (including exports of oil
which account for a large part of this revenue);
(b) The fall in the amount of public funds;
(") The appreciable increase in outside private
investment (which has increased the indebted-
ness of recipient countries).
It is pointed out in the same paper that if one
disregards oil-exporting countries, the net financial
support and reserves were inadequate in the case
of most of the developing countries to bridge the
wide gap between the rate of growth of their exports
and that of their imports.
64. This isabundant justification for the concern
expressed by UNCTAD, the International Monetary
trund and the, World Bank as to the need to formu
late a genuine policy for primary commodities.
C. Stabitization of primary commotlity prices
65. The problem of regularizing primary com-
modity prices at a level that is stable and profitable
for producers continues to be a point of concern
for the AASM as indeed for all the developing
countries. UNCTAD is actively dealing with the
problem; its specialized committee on primary
commodities is engaged in laborious studies in
Geneva although it is making no progress towards
solutions because it is unable to obtain the agree-
ment of the industrialized States. This serious
problem was, however, the subject of important
resolutions passed in New Delhi.
People are always talking about Resolution II/21
passed in New Delhi on generalized preferences but
the five other resolutions on primary commodities,
which were also unanimously adopted by the 132
participants, seem to have been forgotten by the
responsible government authorities in the pros-
perons countries. These resolutions were as follows:
Resolution 16(II): International action on primary
commodities(1) See UNCTAD Doc., Ninth Sesion, GE 69i17.288.
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Resolution 17(II) : General agreement on agree-
ments relating to primary com-
modities
Resolution l8(II): Coordination by UNCTAD of
the actiüties of inter-govern-
mental bodies dealing vdth
primary commodities
Resolution l9(II): Studies undertaken by inter-
national financial institutions on
the stabiliz.alisn of PrimarY
commodity prices
Resolution 20(II) : Minimum guaranteed agricultu-
ral income.
(The full text of Resolution 19 and 20 is given in
Annex I)
66. As regards content theseresolutionsapproxi-
mate very closely to the recommendations of the
Joint Committee and Parliamentary Conference of
the Association in the report submitted on its
behalf by Mr. Armengaud(1), at the time regarded
as a revolutionary, or-more exactly-a pioneer
effort. Following on from his suggestions, the
Commission of the Commrrnities deserves praise for
proposing, in its excellent memorandum of 1968
on the renewa-l of the Yaoundé Convention, clear-
cut and reasonable solutions which were discussed
at length at the Yaoundé II negotiations and
which the Governments of the Member States
unfortunately did not think ût to adopi.
It is, to say the least, rather extraordinary that
thqre is no longer arry discüssion on the Council
and Committee of the Association aboutstabilizin§
primary commodity prices because of the negative
attitude adopted to this problem by certain Member
States, even though it is becoming more and more
of a burning issue than ever in UNCTAD.
67. Indeed the Committee on Primary Commodi-
ties approved several texts at its fourth session
held in Geneva from 19 to 3l May 1969, one of
which concerned the elements of a. policy on
primary commodities(z). The following points from
this document are worth noting:
l. Scope of a Policy on ÿtdrnary comrnodities
A concerted. international policy in the field
of primary products was defined in Recommenda-
tion A.II.1 adopted by theUnited NationsConfer-
ence on Trade and Development, First Session,
on international agreements on primary commodi-
ties, the removal of obstacles to trade and the
expansion of trade.
(1) Dæ. 20/1907 og ,Wap of inæælng sales of AASM products at stable
md remutrative prlc€s..
(8) Qfitcial dments of ttre Trade md Developmmt Councll,eighth session,Supplemmt No.8.
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A concerted poücy which would take into ac-
count, inter alia, the work done by UNCTAD and
other international bodies concerned since the first
session of the Conference, should result in:
(") Helping the international community to enable
the developing countries as a whole to meet
their essential food needs from their own pro-
duction;
(b) Ensuring normal supplies of primary commo-
dities;
(.) Introducing a dynamic element into the
export receipts of the developing countries by
helping to eliminate short-term fluctuations
in primary commodity prices by stabilzing
them at a fair and proûtable level and by
increasing and diversifying the exports of
these countries. 
I
II. Means of imflernenting a Prirnary cornmodities
pol,icy
Stable, fair and profitable prices were one of the
,features of any policy for regulating the market
for a given product.
Stabilization of prices at levels profitable to
producers and fair to consumers could be achieved
by recourse to a range of techniques that were now
well-known and could be used singly or in combina-
tion and vary from product to product. With partic-
ular regard to products exposed to competition
from synthetics or substitutes, stabiüzation of
prices should be effected in conjunction with
scientific and technical research desigrred to improve
the competitiveness of the natural product and to
find new applications so as to create additional
markets and promote modern marketing methods
for these products.
The prices policy should be coupled with
measures to maintain production trends that
ensure a proper balance between supply and de-
mand.
68. Similarly the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank have actively continued study-
ing the problems of financing bufier stocks and
drawing up programmes for the diversification of a
number of the products under threat either from
excess supply on the world market or from com-
petition from syothetics or substitutes. These
studies were made following the resolution, adopted
by the Council of Governors of these two bodies at
their joint meeting in Rio de Janeiro in 1967,
recommending the development of appropriate
machinery for stabilizing primary commodities(8).
(8) Rmlutim No.22-29 oD stabilidtrg primæy æEEodities adopted on
29 Septemb€r 1067 by tàe Coucil oI Govmos of the IMF àt theirjoint mæting with the Coucil of Govmon of IBRD-Sæ IMF-Su-
mary Proædings Amual Meethg, p. 280,
In view of the efforts made by international
bodies and studies that are now public knowledge.
the Rapporteur considers it regrettable that the
Commünity, which in the past has shown initiative
and imagination in proposing practical and reason-
able ways of stabilizing primary commodities,
within the EEC-AASM framework, does not seem
to be interested in this problem at the very time
when the United Nations boües are moving
towards arrangements similar to those proposed
by the Community a few years ago.
69. The representatives of the Member States,
who rejected special solutions for stabilizing the
prices of AASM products at the Yaoundé II negotia-
tions on the ground that they wanted world-wide
solutions that would suit all producer developing
countries and all consumer industrialized countries.
have in fact joined in with the representatives of
other industialized countries in vigorously'discus-
sing' the solutions proposed urithin the framework
of the Committee on Primary Comrnodities.
70. To sum up, if all Member States of the Com-
munity had the political will really to arrive at a
policy on primary commodities, the EEC-AASM
Council ol Association would undoubtedly be the
right setting for working out a common position
for the Twenty four which would then have a real
impact in UNCTAD. Coordinated initiatives by the
Twenty four in this field would make an important
contribution to the policy to be followed in the
framework of the Second Development Decade.
D. AASM agricultural products which compete withI similar European proilucts
71. With the nerr arrangements adopted for the
transitional period and intended to remain in force
for the duration of the Second Yaoundé Convention,
the Community has tried to dispel some of the
concern expressed in the AASM about the import
regulations likely to be applied to their agricultural
products. It will be recalled that misunderstandings
arose between the 18 African countries and the
Six on the construction to be placed on Article 11
of the First Yaoundé Convention and also because
of difûculties which the AASM had encountered
in selling certain processed agricultural products
to the Community (manioc starch and flour, sugar,
rice etc.) ; these difficulties were due to the stringent
nature of the common agricultural policy regula-
tions.
Protocol No. 1 to the new Convention indicates
that the treatment accorded, to agricultural products
covered by a market organization in the Community
shall-unless an exceptional situation arises-be
more favourable than the general treatment ac-
corded to like products originating in non-member
States. These special arrangements would remain
applicable until the new Convention expires. If
changes are made in the common marketing organi-
zation, the advantages granted by the Community
should be equivalent to those enjoyed by the
AASM previously.
After consulting the AASM regulations were
adopted by the Community on beef and veal, ole-
aginous products and products processed from
fruit and vegetables, tapioca, chocolate and manioc
derivatives.
The new regulations stipulate that the products
concerned shall be imported into the Community
without payment of the normal customs duties.
This provision is contained in the regulations
appücable to beef and veal, oleaginous products
and products processed from fruit and vegetables.
In cases where the common marketing organizations
stipulate a levy on the products, comprising a ûxed
component and a variable component, the Com-
munity will not charge the fixed component on
products originating in the AASM. This arrange-
ment appües in particular to products processed
from cereals and rice.
The new arrangements for rnanioc rooüs and, flour
take over the provisions applicable previously, i.e.
an abatement on the variable component of the
levy amounting to 0.12 u.a. per 100 kg (for roots)
and 0.18 u.a. per 100 kg (for manioc flour).
The Community wilI grant complete exemption
on tapioca, ckocol,ate and other cocoa-based prepara-
tions produced in the AASM.
72. Taken as a whole, the new import arange-
ments applicable to products similar to Cornmunity
Products as described in the Sixth General Report
lsee pages 12-19) are more favourable to the
AASM than the previous arrangements. During
consultations held in the Association Committee,
the AASM signified their agreement with these
arrangements subject to certain reservations.
The AASM asked for a further reduction in the
variable component of the levy on m,amioc starch-
They felt thàt the 50 per cent reduction in this
component was not making the product sufficiently
competitive on Community markets.
The Associated States wanted clarification of
the nature of the special measures (other than
financial) which the Community proposed to apply
under certain circumstances to ol,eaÿnous prodwcüs;
these measures would affect the volume of oilseed
imported by the EEC from the Associated States.
Thê htter regretted that the Community was unable
to treat their oleaginous products in the same way
as similar products in the Community itself.
The Council has not yet taken a decision on the
i,ntport regulations for tobacco. However, the AASM
are pleased that the Commission of the Communities
has submitted a proposal advocating continued
axemption from irrr-port duties for products 
-orig"'-
ating in the AASM. Any other mePsurewouldbeless
favourable than the arrangements granted at
present to the AASM.
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The Council of the Communities had intended
the arrangements applicable to sugar imported'into
the Community from the AASM to come into force
on 1 July 1968 at the same time as the regulation
organizing the sugar market in the Six. In the
interim the Community proposed a cash advance
to temporarily balance the financial mechanisms
of the equalization fund stipulated in the OCAM
sugar agreement. The internal community regulat-
ions were adopted on the scheduled date but noth-
inghas yet been done about the import arrangements
for-the AASM. On the other hand Regulation No.
E53/70 of 10 May 1970 satisfied the requirements of
Surinam,by making the internal community arrange-
ments applicable to that country with retrospec-
tive efiect from 1 January 1968.
When the representative of the Republic pf the
Congo asked the Community at the Libreville
meeting whether it intended to apply the arrange-
ments laid down for Surinam to the AASM as well,
the Commission's representative stated that the
EEC Council had not agreed to do so and did not
propose to alter its position for the time being.
It is useful to point out that when the'case of rice
imports into the Community, arose, exceptional
transitional meÉNures were adopted for Surinam,
and the Corhmunity agreed to allow the AASM
the beneût of the same arrangements but for twice
the tonnage. The AASM therefore hope that the
Community will reconsider the regulations on
AASM sugar and adopt an equitable and balanced
attitude towards all the Associated States.
The benefit proposed bÿ the Commission to the
Council ior rnaize (reduction in the levy 0.10 u.a.
per 100 kg) is very disappointing and not likely to
give any real economic advantage to the principal
exporting country in the AASM, namely Madagas-
car. The Council should adopt a speciûc regulation
on the lines of the arrangements applicable to ex-
ports of beef and veal from Madagascar to Reunion
Island when it reaches its decision, in order to make
âIlowance for the. special nature of the trade in
rnuize. between Madagascar and Reunnion Island.
E. Quantitative restrictions on imports of
Copmunity products into certain Assoeiaterl States
?3. Article 7 of the Yaoundé Convention stipu-
lates that the AASM Governments may introdüce
oI retain on a transitional basis quantitptive restric-
,tions pn the importation of products originating in
Member States if the purpose of these restrictions
is to protect their new industries. Any such decisionby the AASM must, however, be preceded or
accompanied by notifrcation to the Comrrrunity in
accordance with Article 3,4 of the Convention and
Article 3 of Protocol No. 2.
fn several cases, however, Associated. States
have failed to consult the Community before taking
a decision and have not reserved an overall quota
for it in compliance with Protocol No. 2._
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These probléms have been discussed individually
in the Association Committee which has generally
been able to clarify and normalizn tlne situation.
Nevertheless the Associated. States must respect
the procedure for consultation laid down in the
Convention just as the Six must consult the AASM
in a rea.l spirit of cooperation e.g. when they lay
down arrangements for importing AASM agricultu-
ral products which compete with similar European
products.
CHAPTER IV
FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION
74. Before analyzing the aid granted by the
Community to the AASM it is worth stressing
the substantial effort made by the Six to help the
underdeveloped countries. According to recent
figures suppüed by the Development Aid Com-
mittee of the OECD, the total amount of aid
granted by the Six in 1969 corresponded to more
than I per cent of their gross national product
and therefore complied with one of the recom-
mendations adoptçd at the New Delhi Conference
on Trade and Development. Aid granted by the
Six varies from country to country between 1.03
and 1.32 per cent of their gross national product;
these percentages are among the highest allocated
by donor countries(1).
75. Aid to the 18 Associated States forms part
of this overall programme. Quite apart from the
bilateral aid granted by the Member States, the
effort made by the Six at Community level was
reflected in the Corrmunity decision, taken in
1969 when the First Yaoundé Convention was
renewed, to increase the absolute value of aid
over the next tve years from the Third European
Development Fund. The new figure is 9l8m
instead of 730m from the second EDF.
A. The second European Development Funil
As of 30 November 1970, a tojal of 707,333,000
u.a., with 647m going to the AASM(I, had been
committed from the second European Development
Fund.
76. An analysis of the sums committed from
the second European Development Fund shows
that flve countries, which are the most important
economically, have received the greatest assistance
(1) the total mout of aid (publis aid private) gmted by tho Six iD lS69
vE as follom (ln §m): Fed*al Repubüc of Gemy lg90; Frææ U42t
Italy 842i Nethslmds 360; Be§i,m 248i Total for EEC: 5188. The
coepüative tgue for the United Stâts is 94646m, reprsmtlng 0.49ptr mt of tàe gros national product.
(â) The diûuenæ betwæn thse two ûguæ is acæmted for by mæms
takm in favou of the oveÉeas depætmeEts md ttre oversG coutries
æd teritorls represmthg a total of 60,178,000 u.a.
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0.4
18.4
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35.4
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0.1
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46.4
18.4
7.8
1.5
(Congo-Kinshasa, Madagascar, Ivory Coast, Sene-
gal, Cameroon) vrith credits amounting to 312.5m
u.a., i.e. almost half the total funds of the EDF.
However, the Commission of the Communities
will have to make a sustained effort to correct
certain imbalances which appeared in preüous
years if'aid is to be distributed as equitably as
possible between the 18 AASM.
The guidelines laid. down by the Association
Council only provid.e a general framework and do'
not make it easy to distribute credits between the
l8 countries whose governments lodge applications
for financial aid for speci.tc projects. The European
Development Fund has to choose between two
options:
(a) Either to distribute the credits as equitably as
possible between the 18 countries at the risk
of diluting the sums available;
(b) Or to give priority to sound projects put
foqward by States which are in the best position
to achieve a rapid rate of economic development,
thus enabling the latter to develop more
independently and act as leaders for the more
backward Associated States.
In fact the Commission has combined these
two formulae and tried to allocate aid fairly so as
to favour sound projects (generally proposed by
the countries with the most advanced economies)
while striking a balance between the 18 countries
in the spirit of the Preamble to the Convention
which calls for the harmonious and balanced
developm'ent of all the Associated States.
77. The following table shows how the distribut-
ion of funds between the difierent sectors of activity
has evolved since the Yaoundé Convention came
into force. It is clear that preference has been
given to f,nancial assistance for productive projects;
in particular there has been a sharp increase in
efiorts to ind,ustrialize the Associated States.
Di,stribution bÿ sectots of actiaity (L)
(r) Bæed on grc @mihents,
($ Excluding lom grmted by the Eürcpetu Investtomt Bæk.
The report on technical and, financial coope-
ration(r) shows that in 1969, as in previous years,
80 per cent of the new credits from the European
Development Fund were devoted to financing
investment projects and associated technical
assistance on the basis of criteria laid down by the
Commission. The priorities formulated by the
AASM themselves, especially in their short and
long term development progrâmmes were also
taken into account, as was the guidance given by
the Association Council in its resolutions 1166,2167
and 3/68.
Following the principles outlined above the,
Commission helped to encourage inter-African
cooperation by promoting projects of joint interest
to two or more States, e.g.:
(1) Sæ Doc.32-III.
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(a) Financing the industrial slaughterhouse in
Ouagadougou desigrred to serve the States of
the Entente Council in connexion with their
cattle-raising/meat programmes ;
(b)The project for genetic improvement of millet
which is initially confined to Senegal but could
subsequently concern all the countries in the
western Sahara area by proüding new and
more productive strains of millet developed
under a programme of applied agronomic
research;
(c) Several highway projects are designed to
provide nationwide networks; this is an impor-
tant factor in interregional trade.
78. In accord.aace with the recommendations
given by the Association Council in paragraph 3
of resolution 1/66, the Community is continuing
to promote concerted action, either in certain key
sectors of activity or in geographical development
zones. In many cases the two forms of concertation
are combined in a single project.
In Burundi and Rwanda, for example, concen-
tration of European Development Fund activity
in the tea production sector has resulted in the
financing of industrialized plantations and then in
the extension of these plantations to the villages.
The tea plautations have been backed by proces-
sing factories which in turn are powered by new
hydro-electric generating stations and high tension
lines. The many projects in this sphere financed
by the first and second European Development
Fund should enable this new form of activity to
become a permanent feature and help to diversify
the economy of these two countries. A total amount
of some 7m u.a. has been invested in Burundi.
EDF-financed projects in the tea sector in Rwanda
include the design of highways to transport pro-
ducts and an executive training programme
for agricultural cooperatives. In all, the EDF has
tnanced 11 study projects with a value of 5.8m
u.a. in this sphere in Rwanda.
79. The priority given to rural production in
1969 as in previous years, accounting for 47 per
cent of the activity of the European Development
Fund, is in Iine with the decisions of the Association
Council and the wishes of the Joint Committee. The
Commission has concentrated on development and
training measures designed to familiarize the local
farmers with new techniques which will increase
productivity and provide encouragement by holding
out the prospect of higher incomes. These measures
include training and technical assistance for
farmers as well as applied research programmes(1).
To give the rural projects a greater chance of
success the Commission has extended its aid by
defraying a proportion of the operational costs in
the early stages.
90 per cent of the projects submitted to the
Commission in 1969 again related to rural develop-
ment. This proves just how important the agricul-
tural sector still is to the development of the AASM
in spite of their desire to speed up the process of
industrialization.
80. The stronger measures to develop production
structures have been accompanied by a very
substantial reduction in price support operations
from 6.2m u.a. in 1968 to 1.36m u.a. in 1969. This
accords with the terms of the First Yaoundé
Convention which provided for the price support
policy to be abolished. The new policy of aid for
the Associated States is based on aid for the
modernization of production structures rather than
on price support.
81. Expenditure of l06m u.a. \MÉLS authorized
in 1969; this was below the annual average for
1964-1968, i.e.l?7mu.a. This reduction is explained
by the fact that credits available from the second
EDF were gradually used up, while (and this is a
still more important factor) difficulties arose with
certain projects while they were being examined.
82. On the other hand progress in implementing
the projects accelerated sharply on previous years.
PaSrments reached a figure of 145m u.a. in 1969,
the highest ûgure since the European Development
Fund came into existence.
In connexion with the 1969 accounts, the
Board of Auditors made certain general remarks
on the preparation and implementation of the
projects; these remarks are set out in Annex II.
The Board noted that as of 3l December 1969, i.e.
8 years after the end of the period covered by the
first Convention, some 150 projects still remained
to be completed out of a total of 387 projects
financed. Only ll were completed in the last
financial year.
83. The Commission of the Communities, which
manages the EDF, has prepared a general specifica-
tion for EDF contracts. This document, which
has still to be approved by the Association Council,
will be useful to industrial companies in all the
countries affected by EDF contracts. It will lessen
the adverse effects of the disparities existing between
regulations appücable in the different AASM
countries which beneût from Community measures.
Disparities in specifications tended to favour those
companies which knew the local administrative
procedures to the detriment of other companies
which were perfectly competitive economically.
84. Without examining in detail every aspect
of financial and technical cooperation which is
regularly stuÇied by the Joint Committee, full
details being given in the report on financial a"nd
technical management for 1969(2) forwarded to
all the members, your Rapporteur wishes to stress
the additional efforts made by the Community
and AASM countries to bring about m ore active sal,es
pron+otion. This is where financial and technical
cooperation become really signiûcant. However
important Community aid may be, it must always
be accompanied by vigorous action on the part of
the AASM to improve their commercial structure.
In 1967 the Community already agreed to
step up its aid for marketing and promoting sales
of AASM products. This idea was ûnally embodied
in the text of the Second Yaoundé Convention,
i.e. in Article 19, which provides for useful new
forms of assistance.
In the spirit of these new provisions of the
Second Yaoundé Convention, the Commission of
(t) See p. 23 of the Report on Finmcial md Techdcâl Mmagem€nt for
exmples of EDF intNention ln the sphere of rual develoPmmt md
training.
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('â) Doc.32lUI.
the Communities has already embarked upon a
series of measures described by its representative
in the Joint Committee at its meetings in Florence
and Libreville. In addition to AASM participation
in trade fairs and exhibitions which will continue
at the request of the Associated States, the Com-
mission has recently issued a 'Guide for EEC/
AASM exhibitors'. It is hoped that this publication,
which has been drafted on the basis of a Community
programme, will improve the commercial impact
of AASM participation in major international
exhibitions. The guide contains information and.
practical advice on the preparation, construction
and management of exhibition stands.
The AASM are also able to apply through their
governments for:
(a) Experts to be sent to study existing trade
structures and propose reforms in the interests
of greater efficiency;
(b) Studies to be carried out to faciütate the
estabüshment of common marketing organiza-
tions;
(c) Training facilities to be provided for foreign
trade technicians;
(d,) Market research studies to be carried out with
particular reference to the means of encouraging
inter-African trade;
(e) The dissemination of information in the Com-
munify and in the Associated States to be
improved with a view to developing trade(r).
85. The increase in aid for marketing AASM
products is justified by the following considerations:
1. The Community market, which is today the
most important outlet for AASM products, is
becoming increasingly exposed to competition
from non-member States; at the same time the
tariff preferences from which the AASM
benefit are being cut.
2. The Community feels that this new form of
aid for AASM products is more adequate and
may, to some extent, lessen the impact of the
abolition of price support at a time when not
all the Member States are yet in a position to
sell their products at world market rates.
If it succeeds in improving the structures and
methods of the organizations and personnel in
companies helping to develop external trade, this
marketing aid will undoubtedly be very useful.
86. The Associated States ale so convinced of
the desirability of rationalizing prodrlction and
marketing that they are making a major effort,
which has already met with some success, to
(r) The Comision is uow working on a 'Vade Mecm' for EEC-AASM
exlprtm whicà wlll æntain detailed practiæI infomatim. Âtr mual
study will be published on the foreign trade of the AASM.
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coordinate their action by organizing their markets
for each product.
\Me do not intend to survey here all the economic
groupings in Africa which are contributing to
coordinated production and marketing. However,
it should be noted that coffee and sugar agreements
have been in existence for several years in the
Common Afro-Malagasy Organization (OCAM).
More recently an association has been set up to
develop rice cultivation in West Africa; this
Association groups together 14 States with the
aim of improving the quantity and quality of
production as well as the conditions of storage and t
marketing. The States will have to supply the
installations and land necessary for research and
training staff; they will also have to make ûrrancial
contributions towards the runni4g costs of the
Common Organization. Last May the Entente
Council, comprising the Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper
Volta, Dahomey and Togo, approved the estab-
lishment of an economic community for cattle
and meat with the airn of modernizing production
and rationalizing meat marketing in the five
countries.
87. The Community could help these market
organizations, especially by granting financial aid.
The European Development Fund has for instance
granted a loan to facilitate operation of the
OCAM Sugar Agreement until the African States
are able to pay their contributions. It would also
be useful for the Community to grant exemption
from the common agricultural policy in favour
of the AASM(z).
88. However, these sales promotion measures
are not enough on their own. Useful though these
m_easures may be, it must be stressed that they
cannot dispense the Community from the need
to lay down an effective policy on primary com-
modities. Rationalization of marketing networks,
the surveying of new markets and efforts to
improve production are doomed to failure unless
producers have the guarantee of a fair and profitable
price level to encourage them to develop and
improve their production.
89. In the sphere of technical cooperation the
problem of study grants and personnel training is
particularly important.
The Joint Committee has already stressed that
investment on education and vocational training
is vital to the economic development of the AASM;
its importance rises with the completion of more
and more agricultural, industrial and iafra-
structural projects involüng the use of increasirigly
sophisticated and expensive plant and machinery.
(f By allowing import quotÆ similæ to the quota for 8,000 tons of sugar
origimtiry in Surlnæ.
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In 1969-70 the Community stepped up its aid
to students and trainees and diversi.fied its activity
in this sector. The number of study grants rose
from 1,182 in 1964-65 to 1,893 in 1967-68 and
reached 2,100 in the 1969-70 academic year. In
addition a programme of scholarships for specific
training courses enabled grrants to be awarded to
830 students making a total of 2,950 scholarships
for 1969 against 1,369 in 1964-65.
Graats for correspondence courses rose sharply
from 1,516 in 1967-68 to 2,060 in 1968-69. The
prograrnme of job-oriented training was enlarged
by the inclusion of instructors to train craftsmen
and managers of small companies. The programme
for training supervisory and executive grades now
concerns some 710 persons.
90. The average success rate of grant-holders in
examinations was 82.2 per cent while 17.8 per cent
failed. These results were identical to those for the
previous year. The survey conducted by the Com-
mission of the Communities among 2,300 former
grant-holders who had completed their training
on 1 January 1967 showed that94 per cent found
or returned to a job in their country of origin.
The jobs taken up Were generally equivalent to
the level of training followed. 29 per cent of grant-
holders went into agriculture, 17 per cent into the
statistical services, 12 per cent into the govern-
ment service and 10 per cent into the social and
he4lth services. The EEC survey also revealed the
requirements for additional training and retraining.
A first follow-up seminar was also held in Yaoundé
in May 1969; it was attended by former grant-
holders who had in the meantime taken up respon-
sible positions in the statistical services of their
own countries.
91. The Joint Committee has already stressed
the need to develop in-sitw training for young
aA,fricans so as to give them tuition which is fully
adapted to the environment in which they will
work later on. But this is not always possible and
many grant-holders still have to train abroad,
especially in the Community countries.
Difficulties have sometimes arisen because, in
the absence of intergovernmental agreements on
the mutual recognition of diplomas, some Associated
States do not automatica.lly recogrrize the validity
of diplomas awarded to their nationals in certain
Member States, and oblige them to complete
a further year's study after their training course
in Europe before they can take an appropriate
post in their home country. The problem of mutual
recognition of studies and diplomas could be
solved within the framework of cultural agreements
between Member States and Associated States.
92. For the 1970-71 grant programme the
Community has tried, within the framework of
the transitional measures, to make credits available
for further action in this priority sector; it has
renewed the grant programme by allocating funds
equivalent to those available in the previous year.
The Associated States would have liked arr
increase in the funds available for grants, but
because the credits of the thfud EDF have been
blocked until the second Yaoundé Convention
takes efiect, the Community felt that it .could
not exceed the scheduled figure for 1969-70; in its
opinion these funds will in any case be sufficient
to renew some existing 'grants, thus enabling
students to complete their courses, and also to
grant new scholarships.
B. Transitioiral financial measures and prospects for
the thiril European Development Fund
93. In spite of the failure to ratify the Ccinven-
tion and in order to avoid intemrptions in the
examination of projects during the transitional
period, the Association Council decided at its
meeting on 29 May 1969 to allow the AASM to
submit proposed projects and programmes for
flnancing from the third EDF; it also decided
that the balance of funds from the second EDF
could be used to finance the studies needed to.
finùize these projects or programmes. Use of the
remaining credits from the second EDF has enabled
studies to continue during recent month through
an overall authorization of 1.5m u.a. opened under
the heading of technical cooperation linked to
irivestments.
94. The Commission has also made use of the
transitional period to prepare measures to be taken
under the thfud EDF. At the end of 1969 the Com-
mission already sent fact-finding missions to the
Upper Volta, Togo, Dahomey and Madagascar to
collect data on the development programmes in
these countries and on the projects which they
intend to submit as well as on the priority they
give to the indiüdual projects.
In 1969 the Associated States submitted 25
new projects to the Çommission which would cost
a total of approximately 37.5m u.a.; only 1l of
these projects are intended to be financed from the
second EDF at a cost of approximately 9m u.a.
14 projects had therefore already been submitted
by the end of 1969 for financing from the credits
of the thfud EDF, to a va-lue of 28m u.a. The
number of applications has increased since then.
As the EEC Commission clearly states in its
report on the management of the EDF it was
therefore 'the lack of further funds and not a lack
of projects which fina1ly ümited the new commit-
ments entered into in 1969.' Whiie the Commis-
sion's departments continued to examine projects
and while the EDF Committee was able to meet
normally to deliver its opinion on future projects,
no decision on financing could be taken before
efiective ratification of the second Yaoundé
Convention.
As a result of the preparatory examination of
the files completed by the EEC Commission and
the EDF Comhittee during the transitional period,
the first decisions on financing from the thirdEDF
can now be adopted at the end of January 1971.
95. Another problem remains to be solved; it
was raised in paragraph 17 of the resolution
passed by the Parliamentary Conference in Ham-
burg, recommending the definition of a timetable
for the payment of Member States' contributions
to the third. EDF so as to enable the fund to receive
interest on the sums allocated.
C. Measures taken by the European Investmant Bank
96. In its own sphere of activity the European
Investment Bank usefully supplemented EDF
action by granting norma.l loans. On 30 November
1970 the total value of the loans made available
by the EIB from its own ressources was 49m u.a.,
distributed as follows:
(a) Ivory Coast (11.7m u.a.,i.e.24.9per cent of the
total);
(b) Mauritania (11m u.a., i.e. 23.5 per cent);
(c) Cameroon (11.3m u.a., i.e. 24 per cent);
(d) Congo @razzaville) (9m u.a., i.e. 19.2 per cent);
(e) Gabon (3.2m u.a., i.e. 6.9 per cent);
(f) Senegal (2.4m u.a., i.e. 5.2 per cent);
(g) Upper Volta (0.45m u.a.)
The other activity of the Bank in 1969 centred
on joint examination with the Commission of the
four projects financed by loans on special terms
exceeding 15m u.a. The Joint Committee welcomes
this coordination of studies and action of the
EDF and EIB, which it has always recommended.
The projects financed by the Bank were mainly
industrial. They will therefore be examined in
Chapter V on industrialization.
. CHAPTER V
INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE AASM AND
ECONOMTC ÇOOPERATTON BETWEEN
AFRICAN STATES
A. The Comm'ritÿ's contribution
97. The Joint Committee and the Parliamentary
Conference examined the problem of industrializ.a-
tion of the AASM in detail during their five
discussions on the working document and sub-
sequently on Mr. DewulJ's excellent report(1).
These üscussions are still sufficiently fresh in the
mind of the Committee members for it to be
unnecessary to return to them here.
It is gratilying to note that in compliance with
the Resolution passed by the Parliamentary
Conference in Hamburg in January 1970, the
General Report on the activities of the Council
devotes a particularly interesting chapter to the
problems of industrialization and the achievements
to which the Community has contributed.
Referring to page 50 of the Sixth General
Report of the Council, your Rapporteur shares
the view of those government ofiicials who consider
that the industrialization of their country must
continue urith efiiciency, modesty and realism.
Mistakes have been made and resources wasted
in the past; while this fact must be remembered
it does not prevent a dynamic approach to the
problem just as it has not lessened the will of the
responsible ofiicials in Africa and Madagascar to
push ahead with their industrialization. The
Association has resolutely chosen industrialization
. 
Ers an important contribution (but not the only
one) to the development of the AASM.
98. The Sixth General Report(z) points out that
as long ago as 1962 the contracting parties fixed
diversiûcation of the economy and industrializ.ation
of the Associated States ÉLs one of the objectives
of the Association; part of the Community's
aid programme (15 per cent) consisted of repayable
aid in the form of special loans granted by the
EDF and normal loans granted by the European
Investment Bank. The Association Council has
shown a special interest in the use of aid for
industrialization and made'the following recom-
mendations in its Resolutions I/66 and III/68:
(a) The AASM economies should be diversiûed:
- 
by extending the range of agricultural and
industrial production both for home con-
sumption and for export;
- 
by facilitating the creation of an industrial
base, in particular by putting local produc-
tion on an industrial footing;
- 
by avoidingill-coordinated action which may
lead to overproduction and competition cont-
rary to the interests of the Associated States.
(b) Special attention should be given to projects
of regional interest in order to ensure that the
economies complement each other more effec-
tively, thus promoting cooperation and inter-
African trade.
(c) Although industrialization is-initially character-
ized by the creation of production units for
consumer goods, the desirability of creating
facilities to manufacture the means of production
should be studied.
99. On the level of practical achievements, the
Community has, through the EDF and EIB,
contributed directly and ind.irectly to the industrial
development of its Associated States. The volume
of aid committed from the second EDF and the
resources ôf the EIB amounts to 86.5m u.a., i.e.
11.9 per cent of the total aid. Of this sum:
(r) Sæ Dæmetrt 3I (10 Jmuary 1970) ol the PæümeEtary ConJmæ.
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(s) Page 50, Dæ.32lIU.
- 
the second EDË committed 41.9m u.â., i.e.
6.3 per cent of the total amount available to it;
the EIB allocated 46.7m n.a, out of a total
of 49n'r u.a. granted to the AASM in the form
of loans.
Type of action
l. ËDF noedsules
100. Total expenditure for 1r6r61fialization of
the Associated States probably amounts to 25.13m
u.a. for the first EDF and 141.6m u.a. for the
second EDF.
Method of Gnenci0g
Preparatory studies for i:rdustrial
investment
Supply of electric power
Infrastructure directly
related to iadustrial projects
(e.g. wharf at Noualichott,
ûshing ports)
Agricultural-industrial complexes
- 
cattle rearing products
(slaughter houses)
- 
oil palms (including oil processing
plants)
- 
tea cultivation (including
packaging factories)
- 
cotton (including ginning plant
and oil processing plants)
- 
cocoa (packaging)
Manufacturing industry (cement
works, textile facfory, s/agon
assembly and repâir workshops)
r,æ6
il,260
11,530
122,879
,ro
5.,264
1,661
1,336
20,260
r6,790
I%L,AN
10
'lb
(dtu tk%an^ ol $.L)
(Souce: Slxth G€Bëal ReFrt, p, 64 bis)
This table shows:
(1) That industrialization of the Associated States
is characterized essentially by the loca.l con-
version of raw materials, especially in the
agricultural sphere, i.e. by setting up a6ri-
cultural-industrial complexes which accounted
for 75 per cent of the Community aid for industri-
ahzation;
(2) Measures taken under the EDF centred on
vocational and technical training preparing
for industrial occupations. The Community
rightly considers tËat an investment poli"ÿ
can only be valid if it is accompanied by a
programme to train the men who will be
responsible for completing and operating the
projects.
In addition the EDF carried out industrial
prefinancing studies to a value of $1,336,000.
Finally some financial assistance granted under
the first and second EDF for the improvement of
economic and social infrastructures contributed
indirectly but positively to industrialization by
opening new possibilities for the latter (the construc-
tion of the Trans-Cameroon railway, the port of
Owendo and many highways are examples).
101. This policy of the European Development
Fund resulted in the completion of the following
industrial projects in 1969 alone(l):
(a) Economic and technical studies for the creation
of a steel industry in Senegal;
(b) Part of the Inga hydro-electric scheme in Congo
(Kinshasa); this will facilitate the creation of
new industries;
(c) In the Ivory Coast, continuation of measufes
to develop cotton productionT concentrating on
rationalization of this crop and on the supply
of industrial equipment for storage and pro-
cessmg;
(d.) In Upper Volta, construction of the industrial
slaughterhouse at Ouagadougou, which will
allow intensiûed slaughtering and therefore
, improve the nutrition of the population while
also leading to an increase in exports;
(e) In Madagascar, construcüon of a new industrial' 
slaughterhouse associàted with refigerating
installations and facilities for the storage and
transport of chilled meat, primarily to satisfy
the mgat requirements of the inhabitants of
Tananarive;
(1) See report of the Comislon to tùe Coreil m the Emagemetrt of firm-
ctal ud tæhniæl æ{trmtioB Gr, 48).
Grants Slrecialloæ Total
4,265 4,265
T2
3
Total t46,6tt 20,170 r66,68r 100
In 88 0/^ L2 0/^ 100 0Â
(f) In Senegal, 
, 
the improvement of millet by
" 
creating new and more productive strains in
order to make good the nutritional deûciency
of the population and reduce imports of food
cereals;
(g) Finaly in the CentrâI African Republic, two
river infrastructure projects, i.e. the develop-
ment of a fleet on the Upper Sangha River and
the construction and fitting out of the river
harbour at Nola to enable timbèr to be exPorted
from a region of forests'
2. Measowes tahen by the Ewepean Inaestment Bank
102. The EIB has special responsibilities for
industrial û:rancing and made an. important
contribution in this sector. The following projects
were financed by ordinary loans from the resources
of the EIB:
Thede prôjects concern the lvory Coast,
Cameroon, the People's Republic of the Congo
(BrazzaviTe), Senegal, Mauritania, Gabon and
Upper Volta.
L03. The co;finan"r+g of indusftial projects in
the AASM by the ElB-whose'share in the in-
vestment varied between 11.3 and 42.3 per cent
from project to project-and other bodies such as
the AASM Governments, private investors, bilateral
aid organizations (aid and cooperation funds), the
Kreditanstalt fiir Wiederaufbau, the Deutsche
Entwicklungsgesellschaft, and multi-national finan-
cia.I institutions (IBRD : World Bank, and Itr'C
: International Finance Corporation) is evidence of
efiective coordination between the Community
bodies which distribute airl and other bilâteral a.nd
multitateral aid organizations; this has often been
encouraged by the Joint Committee.
L04. The Sixth General Report tried to evaluate
the economic impaôt of' the industrial projects
financed by the Community. Immediately after
their completion, the 21 industrial projects ûnanced
by the Community had a favourable influence in
terms of the creation of new jobs, added value,
improvement in trading balances and payments
and even in the sphere of tax receipts. The General
Report evaluates these efiects as follows(l):
Energy 
- 
I project
Mining and quarrying 
- 
2 Projects
Agriculturat and food industry
- 
7 projects
(banana -packing, essential oils,
ôil processing plants, PineaPPle
canning factories, milliag Pl2.1f)
Textile industry 
- 
3 Projects
Fertilizers 
- 
I project
Metallurgy 
- 
I project
a.ooo
20.000
t4.625
4.433
2.430
r.2t6
46.7ÆTotal: 14 projects
Contritution to a total industrial ilvestment of
Number of jobs created directlY
New added value created each Year:
(a) industrial added value, created directly
(b) allowing for foreseeable indirect eftects
Favourable impact on trading balance (by l".b-
stitution for -imports and increasing exports)
Net efiect on the balance of payments after
deducting foreseeable outgoing transfers
An:rual addition to tax revenue (once tax
exemotions Eranted in accordance with the
invesf ment àodes exPire)
226
(6,660)
60
(r,900)
270
(8,860)
83
r70
100
52
2/L:
60
26
t7
69
120
16
It may be felt that these results, in particular
the creation of 8,,850 new jobs in the AASM, are.
still unsatisfactory having regard to the real
needs'arrd the number of young people who have
received school and university education and are
comiqg onto tlte labour market.
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105. In this respect the new Convention reflects
the de§ire of the Community to increase the funds
available for industrialization projects while at the
(i* millim u.a.)
(d* mi,fli.otæ of a. u.)
(estimates in approximate ûgures)
(1) See p.6t.
same time achieüng greater flexibility and efficiency
in the granting of aid through more appropriate
procedures. By joint agreement the negotiators
of the second Yaoundé Convention have made a
number of innovations designed to strengthen the
means of action available to the EIB; this will
make it easier for the Associated States to use
this institution, as the Parliamentary Conference
had hoped.
As regards these new provisions it should be
recalled as indicated in the Sixth General Report
(p. 68), that:
(a) Overall interest rebates may be granted on
Ioans by the Bank at the following rates:
- 
2 per cent up to the end of the fifth year
of repayment on investments in the manu-
' facturing industries in the zones of immediate
influence of the major centres of industrial
development in the Associated States;
- 
3 per cent for the whole duration of the
Ioan on investments in regions which are
relatively under-industrialized or very remote
from sea access; the same rate applies to
investment on tourist facilities.
This rate of 3 per cent can therefore be
considered as a 'special measure' to encourage
investment in the least-privileged regions of the
Associated States.
(b) An outright interest rebate of 2 per cent for
the whole duration of the loan, which may be
cumulative with the rebates mentioned above,
is also possible on loans granted by the Bank
through the development banks.
This innovation and the possibility of
granting loans under special conditions from
EDF resources through the development
banks are likely to facilitate the financing of
small and medium-scale industrial projects
which it would be difficult to evaluate and
supervise without the cooperation of these
development baaks;
(c) Through the EDF resources the Community
wiil be able to contribute to the formation of
risk capital for companies, in particular by
taking up capital holdings; these dperations
must only be temporary. They wiII be examined
and managed by the EIB acting as a represen-
tative of the Community.
106. These new procedures for granting interest
rebates will only be useful if the Commission
actually applies them. It will in fact be remembered
that the previous Convention already made
provisions for interest rebates but they were only
granted on one single loan(l).
(r) This wæ a[ EIB lom for the æDstruction of a fomt road in Gabon;
the EDF gmted a 3 per cmt interest rebate.
107. Irrespective of these technical procedures
laid down in the Convention, the Community
should also base its commercial and industrial
policy on its responsibiüties to the developing
countries and in particular to the AASM through
a policy of industrial transfer which has so often
been mentioned but has still not been properly
defined. Ià its memorandum to the Council on the
Community's industrial policy, the Commission
expressed its concern in this sphere(z):
'The conditions under which a progressive and
orderly transfer of certain industrial activities
could be organized for the benefit of the developing
countries wili be the subject of later studies and
propôsals. It is in the interest of the Community
toadopt a more outward-looking approach towards
exports from the developingcountries. However, this
development which has already begun primarily
in the context of the Associations and which is
likely to be reflected in the work of UNCTAD
should be programmed as accurately as possible
so that the sectors concerned know in advance
the time limits they will be given to adapt them-
selves to a new situation. The Commission will
submit proposals to the Council on this point for
the difierent sectors concerned.'
The Joint Committee would like dlscussions
'to be held with the Commission of the Communities
on the guidelines which the latter intends to
recommend on this subject for the difierent
sectors.
B. The problem of guaranteeing private investments
108. All the Associated States are convinced
that a guarantee on investments is necessary to
encourage industrialization; with this aim in
mind all of them have laid down investment codes
which grant advantages (varying from case to
case) to foreigrrers. Similarly para-governmental
African bodies such as the Mutual Assistance and
Guarantee Fund of the Entente Council guarantee
loans by local investors.
The Parliamentary Conference of the Association
has repeatedly raised the matter of an additional
guarantee, i.e. a multilateral guarantee which
would be financed collectively by 
"ll the MemberStates on part of the funds which they make
available to the Associated States. This proposal
aroused a great deal of controversy; some consid-
ered it essential a-nd others pointless or even
dangerous a.nd immoral.
Government officials in certain Member States
have made progress on this problem and have
proposed a new solution which seems more real-
istic and easy to apply. The French Government
for instance has now decided that the State will
provide insurance coverage (in return for a pre-
(â) Sæ ilppl@ent to Buletin 4/70 of the Euopem Commitle: Prhcipls
æd Guidelines for a Comuity Industrial Poücy,
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mium paid by the industrial companies concerned)
on non-economic risks, in particular nationalization,
arising in connexion with ,investment by',itt
nationals in thq African countries of the Franc
atea,
This guarantee would only apply to ne\.ry
investmentswhichare likely to effectively acceler-
ate the development of the countries in the Franc
area(l).
Similar measures have been taken by the Dutch
and German Governments.
At the Community level, following a suggestion
made by the Association Council and the Parlia-
mentary Conference, the Commission of the'Com-
munities has been asked to study a multilateral
guarantee on investmehts in the AASM.
The President of the \Morld Bank has also
ordered a study of a plan {or insurance on private
investment with a üew to channelling private
capital back to the developing countries.
All these measures are undoubtedly an addi-
tional inducement and will facilitate industrializa-
tion. These guarantees haVe the merit of not
increasing the burden borne by the African States
themselves.
C. Efforts made by the AASM ttremselves topromote
economic cooperation on industrial development
109. As the Association Convention indicates,
the aid granted by the Community can only
supplement the efforts made by the AASM them-
selves. The latter have made considerable progress
in establishing the vital instruments for coordi-
nating their industrialization programmes.
At inter-governmental level, the Conference
of OCAM Heads of State and the conference of
Ministers of the OERS, (Organization of States
bordering on Senegal), the Entente Council and
the UDEAC (Central African Customs and Econo-
mic Union) are both active. To quote one example,
the Conference of Ministers of Planning and In-
dustry in the OERS, held in Dakar last Jrue,
adopted a list of four integrated, sub-regional
industries providing for the creation of two steel
plants in Mauritania and Mali, a paper factory in
Guinea and a petro-chemical complex in Senegal.
An additional list recommends the establishment
of a tyre complex in Guinea, a nitrogen industry in
Mali, a copper industry in Mauritania and a
pharmaceutical products factory in Senegal. In
another resolution on the primary industries, the
same Ministers recommend the creation, ia ac-
Gordance with proposals made by the four States,
of a chemical industry in Guinea, a sugar retnery,
a milling plant and an alumina complex in Ma.Li,
as well as a cement and plaster works in Mauri-
tania.
At the same time they decided to make a
comparative study of their development plans
with a üew to proposing measures of harmonization.
The UDEAC has laid down special tax harmoni-
zation measures and customs practices in order to
establish a domestic market. These efforts have
enabled joint industrial companies to be set up
with the benefit of a single tax system. The Heads
of State of the Union wish to integrate the econo-
mies of the Central African countries more fully.
The UDEAC Heads of State(z) meeting last
Aprit in Bamako, decided to convert the customs
union into an economic commrmity open to all
West' African States wishing to participate. The
report which they drew up recommends regional
industrialization plans so that the products of
industrial projects agreed upon between the States
would benefit from very favourable customs
arrangements likely to make them competitive
with products imported primarily from the indus-
trialized countries.
Speaking during President Senghor's visit to
the Community, President Malfatti said that the
Commission was getting ready to provide 'techni-
cal assistance'. for this great plan in connexion
with the preparation of the union treaty.
110. Similarly,regional development banks such
as the African Development Bank to which 32
African countries belong are actively financing
industrialization projects. In existence for three
years now, the Mutual Aicl and Loan Guarantee
Fund of the Entente Council has already guaran-
teed loans on industrial projects to a value of
2,I24m francs CFA.
111. The EEC Commission can play a useful
part in the coordination now being organized be-
tween severa"l Associated States. A meeting was for
example held in Brussels last July between repre-
sentatives of the governments of Burundi, Rwanda
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to
examine jointly under the auspices of the Com-
mission, the procedure for regional cooperation on
electric por,ver supplies in the Great Lakes area
which are of interest to all three countries. An
outline agreement was reached by which the three
countries will cooperate, first through a study
company and then through an operating company,
on the development of new sources of power and
transmission lines. Short-term measures have also
been taken to meet the energy requirements of
Rwanda.
(r) At the sme time Beasu6 will m@uage Ffench @mpæis to establish,
eqüp æd opmte new indmtrlæ in thæ coutri6. The sphere of appli-
mtion of the guæantæ is cltrly defined. It excludæ spær:Iative ôpe-
mtioN in r€l 6tate, petrcleu inv$tment md the mitrg of æinôs,
cinmæ æd rGtauruts.
32
(s) Ivory Coæt, Dahomey, MaIi, Mauitmia, Niger, Senegal, Upper Vottâ.
, ;1 i ;1 ---; 
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ID. Special difficulties itanding in the way of
industrialization of the AASM
112. lndustrialization of the AASM raises im-
mense problems and will continue to do so for a
long time. According to Mr. Woods, Ex-President
of the World Bank, this is because Africa 'remains
the only continent on which almost all the countries
still do not combine the essential prerequisites
for industrialization.'
The benefits which industialtzation is expected
to bring in terms of economic and social progress
in the developing countries will take a long time
to materialize. According to the Sixth General
iteport the industries which are easiest to develop
have for the most part already been established
in the. AASM over the past ten years. New projects
are likely to encounter greater difficulties which
can only be overcome if the Associated States
themselves manage to enlarge their market by
effectively coordinatiag their industrialization
policies.
This is confirmed in fairly disturbing terms by
the study (referred to earlier) carried out by the
UN Economic Commission for Africa. This docu-
ment states that added value in the manufacturing
sector which had increased at an annual rate of
about 9.5 per cent between 1960 and 1965 began
to tail off signiûcantly during the next three years
and the annual rate only reached 6.9 per cent up
to 1968. To some extent this reduction in the growth
rate since 1965 is attributable to the exceptional
conditionswhich prevailed in many of theprincipal
producing countries. At one time or another in
the 8 years after 1960, non-economic factors
unfavourably influenced manufacturing production
in 5 of the 10 most important producer countries in
developing Africa. In these countries industrial
activity is mainly characterized by initial con-
version in-sitw of primary products of agriculture.
An increasing number of industrial concerns in the
area are becoming involved in simple processing of
this kind. In recent years the African countries
have become increasingly aware of the possibiJity
of creating industries for processing fruit and
vegetables. In several countries of tropical Africa,
such as Senegal, Mali, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, the
Sudan; Kenya and Ethiopia, new factories have
been estabüshed to process tomatoes, pineapples,
citrus fruit and other fruit and vegetables. There
are no\ry projects for setting up more than 20
additional factories of the same kind in other
countries of tropical Africa. Of 30 factories estab-
Iished in these countries and from which the neces-
sary information was obtainable, most are experien-
cing serious economic difficulties and some have
had to close down.
113. The African leaders are well acquainted
with these difficulties and realize the need for
rgflection on the form which industrialization
should takein their own countries and regions. They
now know that industrialization in Africa is a very
different proposition from industrialization of the
European countries. In fact the governments must
face up to a series of special economic factors. The
question of 'employment takes priority. School
attendance and higher training which do not lead
up to'employmênt are a source of grave social
disorder, and may often result in a drain of qualified
personnel who look for jobs elsewhere and try to
find a standard of living which does not yet exist
in their own country. Because of the population
explosion in the 1950's the number, of young people
arriüng on the labour market will increase trough-
out the 1970's. Unless far-reaching measures are
taken, unemployment will become even worse and
by 1980, or perhaps sooner, an explosive social and
political situation will have been created in almost
all these countries.
The African Governments must examine every
possible solution and agree to coordinate their
efforts. The problem is that all these urgent tasks
have arisen at the same timer An active population
enjoying good health which is well-fed and has a
higher level of professional training together with
a more abundant supply of capital to finance
productive investment and larger outlets at home
and abroad to sell the products of these new workers
are obüous preliminary steps-but something
more is needed.
Experts endowed with common sense and imagi-
nation should be called upon to find formulae
enabling more labour and less capital to be used
in every sector of the economy without pushing
overall cost prices up to a prohibitive level. It will.
also be necessary to obtain the active cooperation
of foreigrr investors, most of whom are content to
opt for the simplest solution and reproduce in
Africa manufacturing systems based on the replace-
ment of expensive labour by complex automatic
equipment which is difficult to maintain. But labciur
is not expensive in Africa.
In the donor and benef,ciary countries alike,
governments should recognize the vital importance
of creating jobs and abstain from encouraging
foreigrr investors by measures which tend to reduce
the cost of capital in relation to that of labour. If
subsidies are granted they should apply to the jobs
which are created and not to investments(l).
114. It is not easy to coordinate the efforts of
the AASM to promote industrialization through
regional agreements creating viable econgmic
areas. The industrial choices are often painful. For
all the individual governments which naturally
wish. to defend their own national interests, they
imply an effort of d.iscipline or the renunciation
of operations which are politically justified at
national level.
(r) Thse ideæ wqe put foryæd by Mr. Mætin, Chaimæ of the Develop
mmt Aid Colmittee of the OECD, in a retrrcrt sübmitted to its Tokyo
neeting oD 15 September 1970.
The dilficulties experienced in organizing the
OCAM sugar market are an example: Senegal,
which is a member of this agreement, has preferred
to create its own sugar industries byplanting sugar
cane zùs quickly as possible on 5,300 hectares of
land. Meanwhile the refinery which has been built
will be fed with imported raw sugar bought on
the world markets and not necessarily at the price
fixed by the producers under the Sugar Agreement.
Having regard to national interests, what
government could resist the tempting offer of a
company which proüdes every necessary guarantee
and proposes to establish a sugar industry when
part of the profit would go to the State and sugar
could be sold to consumers at a reduced price ?
115. Similarly it has not yet been possible to set
up the common market for meat in OCAM. There
are, however, very good prospects for developing
domestic trade in OCAM between the Sudanese
countries which produce meat and the densely
wooded countries which consume it. But it is not
easy to balance the interests at stake here. The
consumer countries consider that they are not
adequately safeguarded by the draft agreement
which proposes to establish 'profitable' prices for
the producers. The proposed market organization
was not confined to distribution iurangements; it
also stipulated an increase in production and a
system of regular supplies while provision was to
be made for protection against imports from third
countries. The root of the problem is that the
African StateS do not have the resourcês to set up
a common market organization with a system of
intervention and financing similar to that provided
by the European Guidance and Guarantee Fund
(EAGGF).
116. In the light of their own experience, the
EEC States will readily understand how difficult
it is for the Six, let alonebighteen countries to set
up commom market organizations and rapidly
fosspsnizs legislation in sectors which are recognized
as ütal to the economy.
117. In fact the Associated States will do.all they
can, but it is diffrcult for them to copy a pattern of
development appüed elsewhere, bearing in mind
their own particular context which is unique in
many respects.
While it is true that industrial development is
the only way.of ensuring a more acceptable standard
of living for their inhabitant§, industrialization is
not a panacea. The African States are bound to
notice that the type of prosperity oflered by i4dus-
trial societies in the western world and in eastern
Europe still creates dissatisfaction and new tensions.
The general conditions of life in these countries are
such that social tension does not diminish as
prosperity increases.
Collective thought must be given to the develop-
ment of modern societies and the Africans cannot
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run the risk of modernizing their countries on a
foreign pattern which would lead to an undesirable
social and poütical revolution.
CHAPTER VI
THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EEC-AASM
ASSOCIATION
118. The opening of negotiations between the
European Economic Community and four applicant
countries, including the United Kingdom(l), will
not only raise the problem of establishing Associa-
tion links between the enlarged Community and
the dependent Commonwealth territories but also
of the possible accession to the Association of
independent African States which may wish to
move in the same direction and establish special
ties with the enlarged Community.
The enlargement of the Community and the
foreseeable enlargement of the Association entails
many unknown factors for the AASM and, conse-
quently, some risks.
It is not known how many countries will choose
an association formula on tÏe lines of the second
Yaoundé Convention; nor is it known how large
the new market will be or what economic impact it
will have on the agricultural policy and common
commercial policy.
119. Which countries are Iikely to be associated
with the enlarged Community ?
First and foremost Britain's Associated States
and Dependencies(z) which may enter into an
association with the enlarged Community in the
same way as the existing associated overseas
countries and territories. The form of this associa-
tion would correspond to the provisions of Part
Four of the Rome Treaty and the decision taken
by the Council of the Communities on 25 February
1964, concerning the association of the countries
and territories; this decision wiJl lapse on 31 Janua-
ry 1975. For the period lasting from the date on
which the Treaties of Accession come into force to
the date on which the aforementioned decision of
the Council expires, implementing procedures would
have to be negotiated vdth the United Kingdom.
These negotiations would cover inter alia:
(a) Proüsions on the progressive elimination of
customs duties and quantitative restrictions
(r) Demk, Nomay md Ilelmd.
lsl (al Far Ea§ and, Pæific Ocæn: Bruei, Pitelro, British Solomoa Isluds
Protætomte, Gilbert æd Elliæ Istmrts, New Hebride.(bl 4tladàc Ocm: BatLmæ, Bmuda, Falktmd Istmds md De1æn-
aSnc-!æ, St. I{elæ md DepeÂdmies, British Antætic Tenitory.(cl C-aù,bbun Sz.. Caymm Istmals, British Houdm (Betlze), BrihshVirgin Islands, Tuks md Caios Istmds, Montsànat, itntigua,Dmhie, Gmda, St. Christopher-Neüs-AngüIa, St. Lucia,
st. vinmt.(dl Indian Ocæn: Seychellæ, Bdtish hdim Om Teritory.
between the enlarged Community and countries
of this kind;
(b) Provisions on financial and technical coopera-
tion: principles of participation by the enlarged
Community in aid granted to Britain's
Associated States and Dependencies ;
(c) Determination of the contribution by the
Member States of the enlarged Community to
this form of aid;
(d) Fidng the volume of aid and the procedures
for granting aid to Britain's Associated States
and Dependencies;
(") Measures concerning the right of establishment,
services and capital movements.
After 31 January 1975, identical rules would be
appücable throughout the Community's overseas
countries and territoiries and Britain's Associated
States and Dependencies; these rules will therefore
have to be worked out in due course.
The principle of the association of these territo-
ries seems to have been accepted(l) on the basis of
the procedures laid down for the overseas countries
and territories which are already associated with
the Community, a üst of which is appended to the
decision taken by the Council of the Communities
on 25 February 1964.
120. As far as the independent Commonwealth
States(z) are concerned, it seems that the enlarged
Community could make a ümited ofier at present
to those African States with an economic structure
comparable to thàt of the AASM(3). These countries
would be able to choose between the alternatives
enüsaged in the Declaration of Intent issued in
July f 963 by the Council of the Communities when
the First Yaoundé Convention \ryirs sigaed and
renewed. on sigrrature of the Second Yaoundé
Convention in July 1969.
The text of the Declaration of Intent of 2 April
1963 which sets out the Community's offers is as
follows:
'On the occasion of the signature of the Associa-
tion Convention between the EEC and the AASM,
the Member States of the EEC meeting in the
Council, aware of the importance of developing co-
operation and inter-African trade and d.esirous of
signifying their will to cooperate on the basis of
complete equality and amicable relations in accor-
dance with the priciples of the United Nations
Charter, declare that they are favourabty disposed
to negotiate with non-member countries which make
corresponding requests and whose economic struc-
ture and production are comparable with those of
the Associated States, with a view to concluding
agreements leading to one ôf the following formulae:
'(a) Accession to this Convention in accordance
with the procedure laid down in Article 58,
(b) Association agreements entailing mutual rights
and obligations, in particular in respect of
trade,
(c) Trade agreements designed to promote and
develop trade between the Community and
. 
these countries.'
121. Referring to this Declaration of Intent,
Nigeria and the three East African States (Uganda,
Kenya, Tanzania) appüed for an association with
the Community in accordance with the second
formula.
It remains to be seen which independent African
countries would be interested in an ofier from the
enlarged, Cornrnwniüy and which of the tbree possible
formulae they worild choose.
122. The question as to whether more African
countries will accept a formula of the type laid
down in the Second Yaoundé Convention will arise
when the new Third Yaoundé Convention is negoti-
'ated, i.e. after July 1973.
According to the declaration made by the
Council of the Communities on l1 and 12 May 1970,
the structures of the existing EEC-AASM Conven-
tion are to be maintained since they are considered
an integral part of the Community system in the
same lnay as the Treaty of Rome and the regulations
based on it. Like the present EEC-AASM Conven-
tion, the association formula laid down in the
future Third Yaoundé Convention rigould therefore
include a section on trade, a second section on
fihancial and technical cooperation with provisions
on the freedom of establishment, freedom to supply
services and free capital movement, and a third
section on joint institutions.
If the structures of the existing Yaoundé
Convention are retained, the implementing procç-
d.ures and in particular the preferential arrangement
for trade and financial and technical cooperation
will have to be negotiated between the enlarged
Community and all the applicant countries; this
may significantly alter the content of the present
Association.
123. It is not possible to say at present which
countries will apply for an association on the lines
of the Yaoundé Convention and which will prefer
an association of the Arusha type or a sirqple trade
agreement. It is probable that different options
will be chosen depending on the level of development
of the country concerned and the existing pattern
of its trade.
(1) Iloweve, the æe of Hong Kong is difiemt bæaæ of its momic
situation æd export trade which rais special problems dlûerlng from
tùoæ of the othu dependent æutriæ.
(sl Dæelopi,ng cmnhi.æ in Alûca ùd the Inài,an Omn: E,otswsm, Lstho,
The cmbia, Ghma, Malawl, Mauitius, Nigeria, Slem Læne, Kmya
Swæilmd, TùÆla, Tonga, Ugmda, Zmbia.,
(3) Fc tàe æutriæ in the Csibbeæ ard Irdim Oæm, the problm re
malns in abeymce be@use it rais slmial .llfilcultiæ. The mnomy
of some of thæ æmtriæ is orioted esentially towæds suge exports
but to diffGitrg degrm: suga æmts for 80-90 per ænt of the'total
exlprts frm MaEitiE, 60-70 per æut from Bæbados, about 20 per
ætrt frm Guyæ md Jâmaim, md 5IH@t&omTdtridad aodTobago.
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The question of renegotiating the Association
Agreement with Nigeria, which has never taken
effect, remains open.
For Ghana, whose main export product, i.e.
cocoa, is perfectly competitive on the European .
market, an association agreement of the Arusha
type, enabling it to increase its exports to the
Commrrnity, seems desirable.
Sierra Leone, which exports iron ore, diamonds
and palm oil to the United Kingdom may be inter-
ested in links with the enlarged Community but
probably only if it is given tnancial and technical
assistance.
The position of the three East African States
(Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania), defined in the
Second Arusha Agreement, is already known but
it is difûcult to determine whether they will opt foq
renewal of this Agreement when it expires in
January 1975 or whether they will prefer a closer
association of the Yaoundé type.
The representatives of Zambia have given no
indication of their intention towards an enlarged
European Community but Malawi, according to
statements made by its President, Mr. Banda, on
29 June last, would apply. for association with the
Common Market 'at the same time as the British
Government appües to join the EEC.'
,Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland raise certain
problems because of the customs union between
these countries ,and South Africa.
124. On the basis of these rather rudimentary
facts and other more specific -information, it is
possible to make a number of reasonable assumptions
on the efiects which enlargement of the Community
would have on the 18 A4SM;it is also possible to
show the d,rawbacks and ad,aantages which there
would be for each of them.
125. i'hree factors combine to suggest that it
will be difûcult to maintain the preferential system
appüed under the existing association; firstly the
coming into force of the Arusha Agreement which
grants the commercial arrangements specif,ed in
the Second Yaoundé Convention to the three East
African States (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania) ; second-
ly the probable application in 1971 of generali"ed
preferences for manufactures and semi-manufac-
tures originating in all the developing countries, and
thirdly the entry into the Association during the
next four years of the United Kingdom's Associated
States and Dependencies which would benefit from
the new trade arrangemerlts.
The Community and Commonwealth tariff
preferences raise major difficulties. The United
Kingdom made more concessions than the Com-
munity during the Kennedy Round. It is therefore
doubtful whether it wiI agree to the common
customs tariff at,its present level; if it does, it
would have to re-establish on many tropical
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products, such as coffee, cocoa and palm oil, the
duties which it cut or ab"olished in accordance with
the policy expressed repeatedly at sessions of GATT
and UNCTAD. How would GATT react then ? Is
there not a risk that the tariffs of the enlarged
Community will be harmonized at the lowest level,
i.e. at the level of the United Kingdom backed by
GATT ? Does this mean that the tariff preferences
of the enlarged Association are to be reduced still
further ?
126. It must be recognized that enlargement of
the EEC-AASM Association to other countries
whose products compete directly with those of the
AASM and which already sell their products at
competitive prices on the Community market
without tariff preferences will to all intents and
puryoses compel the 18 States to fall into line very
quickly with world market prices so as to maintain
their existing outlets in the Community without
allowing their new partners in the Association to
steal a march on them. This is particularly true
of products such as cocoa, coffee, bananas and palm
oil.
127. Admittedly the AASM may gain access to
new markets in the United Kingdom, Denmark,
Ireland, and Norway. But this advantage does not
appear certain in the immediate future. The United
Kingdom buys almost all its suppües of tropical
products in the Commonwealth. 99 per cent of its
imported cocoa, 90 per cent of its,cofiee, 99 per
cent of its groundnuts and groundnut oil, 100 per
cent of its palm oil products and copra and 99 per
cent of its bananas come from the Commonwealth(r).
128. Turning now to agricwltwral prodwcüs ahich
comfete uith similar European prod,ucüs, the problem
is disturbing. If the common agricultural policy
remains as it is at present with its stringent system
of protection, and all the indications are that there
will be no changes since the Community has clearly
informed the four applicant countries that they
must accept the common agricultural policy regula-
tions as they stand, the Community will become
increasingly restrictive and will have to take even
stronger defensive measures against the increasiag
quantities of competitive products offered on its
market by all the Associated States. This will apply
to oleaginous prof.ucts, sugar, maize, rice and other
cereals, as well as fruit and vegetables.
The only alternative would be for the Commu-
nity to adopt the more favourable arrangements
granted by the United Kingdom to the Common-
wealth countries. Unlike the Community which
applies a policy de5igned to protect its agricultural
products while making some allowance for the
interests of the AASM, the United Kingdom, which
imports a great deal, grants substantial preferences
to the producing countries of the Commonwealth.
(1) Information supplied by the Særetariat of the Cærdinating Comittee
oi the AASM.
This is the case for sugar, oleaginous products,
canned fruit and fruit juice. In the case of these
products a way should be found of aligning the
ne\il arrangements on the most favourable system,
i.e. the Commonwealth system.
It should therefore be possible to negotiate
an agreement on the lines of the Commonwealth
Sugar Agreement on the basis of the new situation
resulting from the sugar requirements of the
enlarged Community. This would be a very useful
concession to the AASM and would go some way
towards balancing the disadvantages incurred by
them as a result of increased competition from
their new partners in the Association.
12g. In short, it is alrnost certain that thè system
of tarifi and trade preferences enjoyed today by
the 18 countries will be changed both in its imple-
menting procedures and in its efiects. A new econo-
mic situation will arise for the AASM from the
changes to be made shortly-which may well not
be the last-in the common customs tariff and also
from the extension of preferences to an increasingly
large number of coun[ries whose products compétL
with those of the AASM and whose economic
structures are not comparable with those of the
Associated States, whatever may be said on this
subject. In fact,'through their level of development,
the three East African countries, as well as Nigeria
and Ghana(l) are better placed than most of the
AASM to sell their products.
130. It is already known that the countrieswhich
have applied for membership of the Community
, 
are willing to subscribe to the financial undertakings
of the EEC. They will therefore have to share in
'the contributions of the European Development
Fund. Information obtained in 1968 also shows
that the total aid received by the Commonwealth
countries which are likely to enter into an associa-
tion would be in the same order of mag-nitude as
that granted to the AASM(,).
At all events the firral paragraph of Article 60
of the Yaoundé Convention stipulates that the
accession of new members to the Association 'shall
not adversely affect the advanfages accruing to the
Associated States signatories to this Convention
from the proüsions relating to financial and tech-
nical cooperation.'
131. The primary advantage accruing to the
AASM from an enlarged Association would be the
promotion of regional economic groupings thus
helping in the long run to strengthen African unity;
with this prospect in view the 18 Associated States
would certainly be ready to make concessions.
The second advantage for a-ll the partners in
the Association could be the creation of an economic
(1) Always suing t-hât thse æuntriæ ae inteæsted io æ agreemæt
with the Cornmmity.
(2) Iufomatioo supplied by the C@rdiûating Comittee of the AASM.
and trading bloc-consisting of the enlarged
Community and its Associates-which could
speak with a single voice in world organizations
(UNCTAD, IMF, GATT); at the very least the
harmonized position of such a bloc woukl lend it a
force of persuasion which would have political
repercussions.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
132. The Joint Committee felt it necessary to
make a lucid analysis of the situation facing the
Association at present.
After noting the changes which are taking place
in the Association because of the general world
situation and developments in the Member States
themselvès, the Parliamentary Conference must now
forecast future trends and approach these develop-
ments in a realistic and positive frame of mind.
133. The process of tarifi erosion in the Associa-
tion is disturbing for the AASM because of the
very nature of their economic structure which
necessitates a series of measures to protect agricul-
tural products until such time as industrialization
becomes a sufficiently strong force in the economy.
At thesame time measures encouraging development
are necessary to accelerate this industrialization
and allow an increase and diversification of trade
in a range of manufactured products which would
be less subject to fluctuations in market rates than
primary commodities are.
The development of EEC-AASM trade since
the beginning of the Association shows that the
system of tarifi preferences cannot on its own allow
rapid and harmonious development of trade
between countries which have reached very uneven
levels of development.
The Community itself now realizes that tariffs
are becoming increasingly inadequate as a compo-
nent of a d5mamic commercial pôlicy.
134. However the Community which is involved
in a network of worldwide responsibilities, must
not precipitate the movement of tariff disarmament
and suddenly abandon the whole commercial poücy
of the Association. Such action would have disas-
trous consequences for the Associated States.
In the past frve years the Community policy-
whatever the principles underlying it may have
been-has led the AASM:
(1) To give up guaranteed prices for their essential
products and abandon their privileged outlets
on certa.in important markets;
(2) To accept, since the Kennedy Round, successive
reductions in tariff preferences on a nqmber of
primary commodities which are essential to
their economy;
(3) To share their reduced preferences on primary
commodities with other Associated States in
I
East Africa, and, in the near future, with other
African States whose products compete with
their own and whose levelof development makes
them more competitive;
(4) To accept, willingly it is true, the introduction
of generalized preferences for manufactured
products originating in all the developing coun-
tries but subject to conditions and a time sche-
dule which did not correspond exactly to their
wishes.
Under the UNCTAD systems of generalized
preferences in their present form:
(a) The AASM run the risk of losing access to the
'privileged' Community market which in prin-
ciple is open to them, but on which the AASM
will face competition from other more indus-
trialized and competitive countries;
(b) The developed countries have given no speciûc
commitment on special measures to assist the
less advanced countries or to compensate the
damage which the AASM may suffer as a
result of application of the system (except for the
EEC which has proüded a special safeguard
clause);
(c) As yet the AASM have no assurance of access
to certain important new markets such as the
American market.
135. Faced with this rapid development, what
has the Community done to compensate more
satisfactorily the erosion of the preferences and
guarantees from which the AASM used to beneût ?
For several years now the Community has shown
its intentiron of applying a number of different
meitsures and in particular of regularizing the
market prices of primary commodities at a stable
and profitable level if possible by concluding world-
wide product agreements, or taking measures
to protect the AASM within the framework of the
Association until worldwide agreements can be
implemented. However, this objective has tended
to fade into the background while preferences have
efiectively been reduced. The initiative taken by
the Parliameutary Conference and the Commission
of the Communities which submitted reasonable
proposals when it appeared that the second
Yaoundé Convention would be renewed has been
rejected by the EEC Council because of opposition
from certain governments under pressure from their
business interests whose sources of supply and
markets do not lie in the AASM.
Support for. new product agreements is slowly
but steadily growing throughout the world.
136. In addition the Community rightlyrecom-
mends a sa.les promotion policy to take over from
the previous tariff measures. The new Convention
embodies proposals for many important measures
and the EEC Commission has not been slow in
taking the initiative; but its action can only succeed
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if all the Associated States immediately take ügo-
rous steps to change their commercial structure
and bring about economic regroupiags enabling an
enlarged and economically viable market to be
created. But this is a slow process and it will be a
long time before these sales promotion measures
bear fruit. Meanwhile the AASM may encounter
difficulties in the next f,ve to eight years.
137. The progressive increase in financial aid
under the first YaoundéConventionwas evenmore
marked under the second Convention. This is an
important factor.
But it must be noted that in contrast to the
policy of other multilateral aid organizations in-
cluding the European Investment Bank, the criteria
according to which the European Development
Fund grants aid cannot simply be those of economic
viability. The European Development Fund was
founded specifically to play a part in compensating
imbalance between the eighteen AASM States and
to give the least favoured among them better pros-
pects of development through appropriate aid.
138. But this financial aid on its own is not
sufûcient either. It is not the essential aspect of the
Association. As our colleague Mr. Spénalesoperti-
nently statedto theJoint Committee'theCommunity
cannot fully compensate the loss of commercial
advantages by firrancial aid. If a country loses part
of its export income and if the latter is restored
to it in the form of financial aid this only compen-
sates the budgetary impact of the loss of earnings
,but no wealth is created with the attendaat econp-
mic effects and social implications. In addition as
ûnancial ,aid becomes increasingly important it
creates dependence, whereas a sound commercial
policy creates free partners. The spécific aim of the
Association was to promote adequate expansion of
the economies of the eighteen AASM through a
harmonious balance of commercial and tnancial
measures, so that in the long run financial assistance
would no longer be necessary between economic
partners who would have become less unequal. If
the Community fails to take sufficient steps to
promote the development of trade and economic
expansion in the Associated States the ultimate
result will be the opposite of what is desirable; in
one case the Association will have succeeded, in the
other it will have failed.'
13g. The Community has also embarked upon
the road of industrialization of the AASM. The
second European Development Fund and the loans
granted by the European fnvestment Bank are
contributing to the completion of a number of
industrial projects and others should follow during
the validity of the second Yaoundé Convention
thaaks to the new instruments and additional
credits stipulated in the latter.
The important contribution which the Commu-
nity is a-lready making in this sector will be stepped
up still further in the future.
But the introduction of generalized preferences
will unfortunately be a handicap to industry in the
AASM unless these preferences aré accompanied
by the essentipl guarùtees taid down in New Oettri
'which,would make them acceptable to the AASM.
It is paradoxical'for the Community to conftibute
towards the creatiqn of industries in ,the AASM
when the external markets for thele indrrstries
, are threatened from the outset. Some industries
which have been created with the aid of the Euro-.
pean Development Fund are alread.y ertcotrntering
, serious difficulties. In their desire te,.indicate their '
solidarity with the 'Group of. 77' , i.e. with all the i
underdeveloped countrie§, the AASM have probably
not realized all the implications' and rigks which
the'froposed system may entail for their"own,'industries. 'i
primary commodities and the financial rneasures
necessary to-increase their overall aid. to a level
corresponding to 1 per cent of their gross national
product(l). Of the three resolutions adopted.at the
ûrst UNCTAD Cpnference, the one on generalized
preferences was the easiest for the rich countries
to implement immediately since it involved few
rlsks for their own manufactured products. Indeed
the productivity of their industries is so high that
for the ten years during Which generalized preferèn-
êes will be applicable competition from new indus-
tries in the developing countries witl be easy to
withstand and nonæxistent in the case of advanced
technology industries.
, Many other measures will have to be taken
during the next develgpment decade in addition
to generaJized preferences. '. 
-
14-0. For the AASM, genera"tized preferences are
coming sÇveral years,too soon belore thç-rqiî{ustria-
lization hasadva:ped sufûpiently and tlieir.ecpno-
mies grown stro4g.enough'; moreover the, meÈrsures
accompanying a developpent poliiy fyhich would
enable thdm to fight this commercial battle,on,an
equal footing and o$her measures' to coutrfefact
their worsened trading positions have not.yet been
taken' 
', 
r'rl,'t 
" 
'
141. Reference is made repeatedly tp.Resofution(II) Zt of the New Delhi Conference on generalizêd
preference§ but the other resolutions adopted
unanimousÿ by the 132 participants in this Con-
ference, in particular the resolutions on primary
commodities, have been forgotten by Govern-,
ment officials in the rich countries. While_the latter
haÿe faken relatively rapid measures on thè problbrq
of generalized preferences they have not shown
the same, hastç ovèr the resolution5 relating to
(r) On_the otàu hahd tàe slx EEC Mmber Statæ have cômpüed with thls
recorhineodado sinæ the total aid ganted by eac,h of tàem exceed.s 1
' per,c€tt of their ûatt@al prodüot.
142. The Community must thêrefore keep a
, cfose watch on the progress of the Assôciationând
envisage a lucid oaeral,l'and coharent policy'accom-
panied by a range of diversified measures ur the
commercialand finaucialsectors if thebasic objective
of the Associltion is to be safeguarded.
It is the duty of parliamentarians in the 24
Statestodrawthe attention of the executive bodies
. to the problerns of the Asdociâtion which appear
important to them and. also to the nieasures which
dhould be taken in the future.
' Having regard to the probable enlargement of
the Communliy with all the consequences thiô will
have for the Association, the Parliamentary Cqnfe-
' rênce must cooperate with'the EEC Commissioh
and the Association Council'in'a revièw of all the
existing measures. It must show imagination and
boldness in pursuiqg the ultimatg. aim of the
, Asçociation which remains uuchangefl.
'39
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ANNEX I
Recommendations Nos. 19/tr and 20/II adopted by UNCTAD in New Delhi
l9 (II) Stud.ies by international fi,nancial institutions on stabi.lization ol cornmodity prices (t'1
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Reaffirming the importance and urgency of so conducting commodity trade as to
make available to the developing countries external resources of which they stand in
grave need,
Noting the resolution on commodity price stabilization adopted by ttre Board of
Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
aûd of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at the Rio de Janeiro session in September
1967 ('z) requesting a study of the conditions in which IMF, IBRD and the International
development Association (IDA) could participate in introducing suitable machinery
comprising commitments balanced as between producer and consumer countries and
allocate the necessary funds thereto,
l. Emphasizes the importance of the role of IMF, IBRD and IDA in helping to solve
the ûnancial and development problems arising in world commodi§r trade;
2.- Calls the attention of these agencies to ttre importance it attaches to the study
requested of them in the abovementioned resolution;
3. Expresses the hope that this study will contribute to the solution of commodity
problems;
4. Further expresses the hope that these agencies, in prepariug the study, will concen-
trate, inter aüa, on the problems of ûnancing buffer stocks and diversiûcation;
' 6. Reguests these agencies to transmit tJre study to UNCTAD, in view o{ the latter's
responsibiüty, as deflned in General Assembly resolution 1995 (XIX) of 30 December
1964, for the framing and implementation of an iuternational policy on commodities.
77th plenary meeting,
26 March 1968
20 (II). Guavanteed, minimwm agricultural i.ncome(s)
The United Nations Cooferencà on Trade and Development,
Recalling Article 66 of the Charter of the United Nations which provides, inter alia,
that the United Nations shall promote 'higher standards of üüng, full employment,
and conditions of economic and social progress and development',
Considering that the existence of reasonable and stable remunerative prices for
primary commodities exported by the developing countries would help to ensure,
for the producers of such commodities, an enhanced and more equitable purchasing
porver,
(1) The Conlerence adopted tJlis r€solution wità one abstmtlon.
(8) Resolution 22€ 
- 
Stâbiliatim of prim of pimary products, adopted on 29 S€ptmbtr 1967, by the Boæd of Govmæi
of tàe Interqational Moqetary Fmd, to ioint s§im wlth t&e Boæds of Govemors of the Internâtimal Bæ-k for Recm-
:qpti! md DweloPmæt, the Intmtioaal Flnææ Corlnmtion æd the Intem6onal Dwelopmmt Asociation (sæIMF, Srmmcy Proûædltrgs, Amual Mæting, 1967, p. 28O).
$ the Conlmce adopted this resolution wtthout ali&sæt.
,t0
l. Emphasizes that remunerative prices for primary commodity exports would help
the Governments of the developing countries to ensure a reasonable income for the
producers;
2. Notes with interest the proposal in ttre report of the First Committee of the Minis-
terial Meeting of the Group of 77 cootained in the Annex f to the Charter of Algiers, (1)
3. Requests the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, in cooperation with the competent
specialized agencies, to submit to the next session of ttre Committee on Commodities an
outline of a first study on the possibiüty of deûning the elements of a minimum agricultural
income for wage-earning and other producers of primary commodities in developing
countries and the links which could be established between such a minimum agricultural
income and an organizatiotr of trade in primary commodities of interest to those countries.
77th plenary meeting,
26 March 1968
,4.L
(r) TD/A8iAdd. l, Âmex I.
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Extraçt fioq the report of ttre Board of Auditors of tÉe Eqrppeair Economic Commnnify
i ,. on the 1969 accouuts of.the,EupopearilDevelopmpnt Futrd 
r
(Doc., PE rl7ltlJ B 1970-7r)
a) The frst comment relatgs to the very serious delays afiectlng the difierent stages
for implemeiiting ttr'e projects fraanced by the EDF; these stages are as follows:
(a) From submission of the project tolthe decision cln financing;
(b) From the decision on ûnancing to the trst call for tenderi
(è) From the caJl for tender to the start of'work,
(d,) From the start of work to provisional acceptance,
(e) From. provisional acceptance to completion of the proi'ect.
The tipe which elapses between the date on which a project is submitted and the
date of the ûrst qall for tender which marks tJre beginning of the implementing stage
often exceeds two or three yaers. The date on which tJre decision on fiaancing is'taken
. 
u,ithü tJris periôd varies. In this sphere there is a conflict,between the politiàl option
consisting in accepting a very brief ipitial draft so as to meet tÈe wishes of the Govern-
ments rapidly and ttre technical and econoÉic option, which consists in awaiting the
results ôf the studies an=d preparation of ,the complete plan for implehentation before
.taking the decision on taanciug.
The choice seéms to depend either on the political climate or on the nature of ttre projects.
The second formula would be preferable if the time taken to f.nalize the project before
a decision is reached really enabled the subsequetrt stâges to be speeded up. But this is
often not the case. In addition the central administration of the EDF is perhaps not
properÿ equipped to make this prelinrinary examination and it is surely undesirable for
the authorizing ofûce to be called upon to act as a techaical assistant to tJre beneficiary
Government at this stage.
For the first EF.D in general, the lach of adequate forward planning and the relative
rapidity witp which decisions on financing have been taken explain tàe abnormal length
of the stage of ûnalizing the f,les befoie calls for tender can be issued. This pieparatory
work is entrusted to study ofûces which ûever respect the contractual'time limits; the
result is that.thê ûles are often imperfect aad incomplete. Preparation of the tender
documents then gives rise to irrterminable correspondence between the Government
. responsible for the project and the EDFadministratiôn and in"many cases supptemeitary
conditions are often introduced at a late stage thus delaying still further the date ou which
""iî ar#îi"-ai.u excessive betwéen the date on which the ofiers are opened and
the date on'which tbe contracts are signed. They are due to an imprecise deûnition of tàe
respective responsabilities of the Government cotrcèrned,,the authoriaing ofûce'and tho
EDF adininistration in evaluatiûg the offers and in making a final choice of the supplier;
this leads to lengttry negotiations and delay§ in appending the 6nal signatures.
AII too often gaps in the tender documents mean that olgo"iaUo* have to be re-
,opened wittr the phosen supplier to introduce new elements in the contract or take into
accouf,t changes made to thè programme in tàe meantime,
The efiects of tlese delays can be'lessened by sendi-ng an order letter or issuing a
seruice order before the contract is signed, but these procedures entail other drawbacks.
By comparison delays in actual implementation of the works appear less disturbing.
15s adrrlinistration is then on stronger ground because of tJre penalty clauses applicable
in the event of a delay. At this stage difÊ.culties arise more often than not from short--
comings in the management and supervision of the works irrespective of whether these
senrices are proüded by the local, adminisl6alions or by a specialized ofûce.
After proüsional acceptance of the works, the completion of the contracts and definitive
closure of 'the projects still require many months during which disputes frequently arise
between the contractors, fhe responsible'Government and the EDF administration, in
particular with regard to application of the penalty clauses or alterations riecessitated
by defective workmanship
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b) The second general comment concerns the problems raised by the completion of
studies; these problems affect both the time required for implementation and the quality
of the work. More often than not there is a delay of several months but even tàen the
proj ects are inadequate and the implementation frles incomplete so that operations cannot
begin efiectively.
For reasons of geographical distribution application of the quota rule may well have
led to a neglect of the rules of technical competence while studies have been entrusted
to offices which are not well informed of the conditions of economic üfe in Afica.
In addition the EDF administration does not seem to be in a position to take ûnancial
sanctions when time limits are exceeded or when there are inadequacies in the project
which are duly noted by the competent authorities, The clauses in the contracts could
well be more precise on these particular points.
Simitarly it would somètimes be desirable to make a more realistic appraisal of the
practical possibilities of the projects in which investments are made and of the funds which
could be allocated to cover expenditure on, maintenance, running costs and renewal which
are all necessary during the operation of these projects.
An inadequate preliminar5r appraisal of the projects or failure to forecast recurrent
costs always reduce the viability of the financed projects substantially and lead to inade-
quate use of capital goods or even to their rapid deterioration.
c) The final comment concerns the procedure for reüewing the agreements on fina.n-
cing. These seem to be too directly linked to an obseryance of the ûnancing ceiliags(with a margin of f l5.per cent). But sweeping changes made during implementation
afiecting the time required for completion or the basic consistency of the programme, or
more often than not both these factors at once, do not always lead to a review of the
agreement if the overall ûnancial commitment has not been exceeded. Very often,
however, these changes completely distort tJle sipitcance and scope of the project which
formed the basis for the decision and the agreement to proüde tnancing.
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